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Abstract 
 
VIRTUAL REALITIES AND REAL VIRTUALITIES 
 
 
Orkan Telhan 
M.F.A. in Graphic Design 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bülent Özgüç 
Co-Advisor: Zafer Aracagök 
May, 2002 
 
 
This study endeavors to explicate different conceptions of 
virtuality in relation to the concept of technology. Departing 
from the popular conceptions of virtuality discussed within 
the framework of digital technologies, the study aims to 
elaborate on the subject within different contexts where the 
nature of virtuality is not confined to a specific definition 
but expanded within all different considerations. The nature 
of relation between virtuality and reality is discussed under 
the influence of a number of complimentary conceptions 
introduced by  
G. Deleuze and H. Bergson. 
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Virtual Realities and Real Virtualities 
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1:36 PM; June 15, 1969 
Robert Barry  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Virtuality is a concept about peculiarities. It mostly 
announces perhaps something other than itself every time, 
within all different considerations, and hesitates to settle a 
meaning, a definite conception that naturally corresponds to a 
particular subject. Many different interpretations, 
associations and considerations of virtuality actually do not 
agree upon one actual 'state' or 'condition' of virtuality, 
but to a great number of different articulations within 
different trajectories. Correspondingly, each consideration 
for virtuality thus reflects different conceptions, 
systematics, and parameters that continuously defer any 
locality for its meaning. As each conception of virtuality is 
handled differently, the virtual subject is generally 
experienced in relation to other conceptions where other 
meanings are mostly postulated as 'opposite' states, 
conditioned 'other' than virtuality. 
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It is possible to observe one of the most frequent uses of the 
word 'virtual' as a suffix to the word 'reality,' in which 
virtuality is determined with what is presumed as real, and 
projected onto something 'other' than what was assured as real 
at particular context. Virtuality is posited as something 
other than the reality, but the 'otherness' is nevertheless a 
'vague' otherness, that does not correspond to something 
particular, but only a difference, proclaiming the reality 
itself as the determinant of the meaning, to present both 
itself and conditions its very other at the very moment. The 
meaning of virtuality is immanently imbued with a separation, 
with a difference. However, the way this explicit separation 
is handled, will be the core of this study.  
 
This is just the sense in which the words 'virtual' and 
'virtuality' are used here. There is a multitude of different 
relations presented to grasp the nature of virtuality, and the 
sole purpose ceases to embrace a potentially more significant 
or more influential conception among other considerations, in 
fact the intention is to follow the subject traversing 
different relations with other conceptions and concentrate on 
it as a becoming of a reality by itself. 
 
Today, virtuality is mostly associated with computer 
technologies, cognitive thinking models, artificial 
environments and is often figured as a task to achieve, merely 
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an activity of presenting something intangible, fictitious, 
and unreal, that is something 'unnatural' and absent from the 
so-called 'real' world. Indeed, different levels of virtuality 
are discussed under different circumstances, and a conception 
of progress, a history of improvement is often posed on to the 
virtual subject when one medium's capability of representing 
the quality of virtuality is put in relation to another's. For 
instance, computer environments are recurrently perceived as 
more virtual environments than lets say books or images, when 
compared in terms of the level of presenting artificiality, 
often by the claim of their ability to provoke multi sensory 
experiences.  
 
There is a genealogy of the different trajectories of 
technology that confront with the conception of virtuality and 
introduce different instrumentation of thought that are more 
or less successful in emphasizing the experience of sensing 
the difference between reality and virtuality. This, indeed, 
is what is most commonly maintained by all conceptions. The 
nature of difference is experienced as a reality, but the 
difference itself is not handled as virtuality, as a different 
nature for constructing relations. 
 
Likewise, throughout the research, it is desired to advance 
the conception virtuality without particularly concentrating 
on a definite domain of technology or focus on a certain 
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medium, such as computational environments, virtual reality 
installations, or particular visual and verbal media. This 
study is not aimed to provide any answers to the question 
'What is real, or what is virtual?' and it should not be 
regarded as a ground of discussion that means to acquire a 
definite method, an order of knowledge for any exact 
conception of virtuality. Instead, by trying to avoid any 
preconceptions that correspond to the claim of a certain 
particular virtuality, it is favored to approach any 
conception in its own exactitude, in its own awareness in 
relation to virtuality, without positing a legislative 
attitude.  
 
As this study is not intended to accomplish a complete 
extensive analysis of different virtualities presented among 
disparate modals of thinking, it tries to emphasize mostly the 
involvement with the activity of thinking about virtuality in 
relation to other conceptions introduced by different 
philosophers. These different conceptions and different models 
of thought do not point further possible representations for 
virtuality, but in fact articulate on a series of 
bifurcations, unforseen directions in which virtuality can be 
less and less appropriated as a definite subject, and grasped 
each time as a more intensified concept. It would be 
contingent to state that this study does not mean to advance 
one particular conception as an opposition to the other. The 
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relation among them can be contemplated as a relation 
postulated preceeding the introduction of any oppositional 
modal of thinking and merely correspond to an exercise, to the 
movement of thinking along other conceptions, other relations 
for unforseen ends. As a definite figuration for virtuality 
would necessarily attain only to a deduced and limited 
consideration addressed to a particular point of view or to a 
particular kind of disclosure; the subject will be preferred 
to be handled with all of its divergence, without any 
privileging or negation of thought, that may obstruct the very 
thinking itself. Like every thought operating in relation to 
former considerations, this study will inevitably be in 
association with some suppositions, however this quality of 
relations are intended to present the focus on the nature of 
the 'relations' unlike privileging one with respect to 
another.  
 
The first chapter of the research discusses merely the 
technological connotations of virtuality within the particular 
framework of digital technologies. As the popular vocabulary 
which discusses that virtuality is oriented towards the 
contemporary technological framework, it is considered 
deliberate to start with the existing conceptions of 
virtuality and the critique posed onto them. This 
contemplation aims to discuss how these articulations, these 
ways of setting relations project themselves onto inadequate 
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presuppositions that do not discuss the nature of relations, 
but only a limited idea of virtuality which is intrinsically 
restrained by its confined conceptions bound to particular 
perspectives.  
 
The conception of technology is often associated with a 
diversity of definitions based on different models of 
thinking, which are continuously changing parameters, 
mechanisms referring to historicist standpoints. As these 
definitions do not follow a consistent path, and usually focus 
only to singular planes of activity, different meanings are 
usually appropriated to signify particular kind of relations 
ordered between human beings and their needs. Different 
trajectories of technology are depicted separately from the 
nature of beings and approached with a distinguishing attitude 
that grounds the opposition between the nature of beings and 
the culture that built upon with those particular kind of 
activities shaped throughout the flow of time. 
 
The conception of technology, in this text, will not be 
handled by focusing onto a particular activity, or privileging 
a particular medium that instrumentalize a specific order of 
knowledge ascertaining certain kind of relations configured 
with reference points in time. Instead, technology will be 
considered as the sum total, the immanent cartography of the 
intrinsic and extrinsic relations among singularities, bodies, 
 7 
and differential elements that are not figured according to a 
particular perspective such as a being naturally identified 
with a definite embodiment such as a human-being, animal or a 
thing… etc. As each figuration of thought, once addressed to a 
discrete conception of the subject, would necessarily be 
inferior in presenting the multitude of relations; these 
critiques are only presented with their own arguments that 
implement their own modal of thinking, their singular way of 
contemplation on the fabrication of thought. 
 
In the second chapter, there are a number of concepts 
introduced from philosophies of Spinoza, H. Bergson, D. 
Deleuze and J. Rajchman. These conceptions are therefore 
presented to foreground Bergson and Deleuze's conception of 
virtuality that introduces a different conception for the 
nature of difference and that provides further articulations 
on virtuality based on a different way of acquiring relations. 
These different conceptions are considered in a mutual and 
discursive relation with each other and along each other, so 
that, different influences on virtuality are observed not in 
controversially, but in fact in virtuality that structures an 
unsettlement and indetermination for their figures of thought. 
These conceptions do also correspond to the vocabulary of 
meaning that discusses virtuality within the technological 
framework. However, this locality is not aimed to present 
somehow a legitimizing conception, an alternative thought, a 
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truth that may promise to reflect better or preferred 
understandings of virtuality within the same framework. In 
fact, this locality can be understood as a neighboring for 
concepts that shall provide an opening for the discussion of 
virtuality that is once obstructed within the very same 
vocabulary.  
 
There is the presentation of a series of possible remarks 
within this study that discuss the nature of the relations 
within a number "differenciated"1 concepts. In this respect, 
the aim is to present different experiences, different 
trajectories for discussing virtuality, and yet strive to 
elaborate on both with the intrinsic and the extrinsic 
qualities and quantities of the relations. Once this text is 
exposed on thinking on virtuality, it may only reflect 
experiences with thought that are expressed when impinged with 
a multiplicity of relations, and eludes attaining a certain 
argument about a 'knowable' conception of virtuality. The lore 
of virtuality is not immanently deferred, but perpetually 
intensified within itself by every reconsideration. This 
study, therefore does not aim to suggest a confrontation with 
a dissolution for any existing conception of virtuality, but 
would rather prefer to point an unsettled character, indicate 
an inability to represent the infinity of relations that occur 
for each conception at the same moment. Virtuality abruptly 
dismisses to dismiss any former understanding, any formed 
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figuration of thought about itself and instead considers each 
of them with their singular histories, as assemblages of 
complexities, intensities and extensities.  
 
If a conception is considered with an opposition to an other, 
it often infers a form of thinking emphasizing particular 
figurations of thought or determined beings for meanings, and 
therefore become subjected to a claim of presenting definite 
exteriorities between conceptions. Throughout this study, the 
conception of virtuality would be discussed more or less at an 
a priori state in which both its inside and the outside, and 
the character of relations that constitute one in relation to 
other are not fixed yet. Thus each attempt for uttering a 
meaning for virtuality would only be an increment in 
appreciating an awareness for comprehending the complexity of 
its singular conception that is on its own way of becoming. 
  
The reality of virtuality can be conceived as the very 
experience of the force of thinking along each and every 
conception that accumulates within the geography of this text. 
Thereupon, it would only be the finitude of this very text 
that will configure the ground, this confined plane for 
discussion for the nature of thought investing on its very 
virtuality.  
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2.  ON VIRTUALITY 
2.1. Virtuality as a Technological Metaphor 
In popular vocabulary, virtuality is usually considered as a 
subject that is articulated only in a context where the form 
of virtuality becomes the constituent of the meaning. Virtual 
becomes part of a language where there is always the desire to 
construct a virtual world, a virtual house, a virtual space, 
that is a virtual ‘thing’ which actually is not present in the 
reality, but needed to be presumed ‘as if’ real only as a 
metaphor, a simulation or as a prosthesis for the real. 
Virtuality as a suffix to reality is considered as a modal of 
representation, a technical reproduction for the perceived 
reality. The condition of virtuality is always reserved for an 
application, a construct, a modal that is subsumed in the 
technological framework providing a mechanism that structures 
virtual in relation to an existence, whose absence is reserved 
prior to any presence.  
 
Attending both to a cultural and technological nomenclature, 
virtuality is 'mediated' as a digital representational method 
within the dynamics of the contemporary visual culture. 
Virtuality is considered mostly as the technological concept 
in which one might expect both the object and the subject of 
virtuality provided within the medium in which it is 
presented. For example: Virtuality is considered as an 
attenuated existence in a computer-generated world, or 
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discussed as an immersive experience in a simulation 
environment provided with a range of different access devices. 
The user of a particular kind of apparatus is registered as an 
agent introduced from an 'outside' real world to the 'inside' 
of a virtual world. The agent is transformed from a 'reality' 
into a symbolic value, a metaphor, a 'virtuality,' an artifice 
that can navigate, interact and become engaged in an affective 
experience. An immersion, a willing suspension in the 
disbelief of its former condition provides the agent a 
temporary visit to the realm of virtuality. Its consciousness 
has been 'extended' through this immerse exercise so that the 
agent becomes part of a vocabulary of presence in which its 
internal circuitry has been excessively stimulated to be left 
open to an outside. Now the natural being is transformed into 
an artifice, a habitant of an anthropic space.  
 
Virtuality is often presented as an actualization for humans 
to visualize, manipulate and interact with computers. 
Computers generate visual, auditory or other sensual outputs 
to the user either within the computer or at a display screen 
presenting an environment that can either be a model, a 
simulation, an augmented reality or conceived as a tele-
presence that corresponds to a nature of becoming subjected to 
a displacement with the perception of an imaginary distance 
outside the actual one. Either the whole world is transformed 
into a computer interface (ubiquitous computing) or the 
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interface is totally erased, in order to provide either an 
appealing interactive television monitoring and rearranging 
the physical world or a virtual reality that is refashioning 
the immersive qualities of Hollywood films. If asked a popular 
definition can be traced as follows: 
"Virtual Reality is an interface that immerses 
participants in a 3-dimensional Real-time synthetic 
environment generated by one (or several) computer(s). 
Input to the system can be done simultaneously with body 
movement tracking and verbal commands, and devices such 
as ‘wands,’ ‘data gloves,’ etc. The result is 
simultaneous stimulation of participants' senses (Mainly 
vision and hearing, and occasionally touch) that gives a 
vivid impression of being immersed in a synthetic 
environment with which one interacts" (Boyer).  
 
The users can interact with the world and directly manipulate 
objects within the world. Those can be physical simulations or 
simple animation scripts that run with the interaction of the 
user accordingly. Hardware such as image generators, 
controlling devices, position trackers, head mounted displays 
are used to gather information about the user, and used to 
react upon with a simulation based on the interpretation of 
the information provided. They can be either presented as 
realistic simulations or 'simulacra' that bear no necessary 
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resemblance to anything existing in the physical world. The 
immaterial one transcends the material environment. 
 
This environment is considered as an immersive space in which 
the user is embodied and disembodied at the same time. The 
user is presented both within the environment as an actual 
being providing the information necessary for the 
representation and at the same time, a being that is always 
presented at a critical distance within the externality of the 
mediating environment. As the opposition between the reality 
and virtuality is at the locus of this technology, the 
immersion into the environment is always kept in a duality of 
being inside and outside to the environment secured by the 
binary opposition. 
"Wearing a VR helmet, you can visit the world of the 
dinosaur, then become a tyrannosaurus. Not only you can 
see a DNA molecule; you can experience what it's like to 
become a molecule” (Davies).  
 
Both the experience of being a Dinosaur and the artificial 
Dinosaur is based on the level of human knowledge that is 
capable of representing the reality of the information of what 
we understood as being a Dinosaur. As Char Davies argues 
"If we create a model of a bird to fly around in virtual 
space, the most this bird can ever be, even with 
millions of polygons and ultra-sophisticated 
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programming, is the sum of our (very limited) knowledge 
about birds: it has no otherness, no mysterious being, 
no autonomous life. What concerns me is that one dry out 
culture may consider the simulated bird (that obeys our 
command) to be enough and perhaps even superior to the 
real entity. In doing so we will be impoverishing 
ourselves, trading mystery for certainty and living 
beings for symbols...a world in ‘man's’ own image" 
(Davies Natural Artifice). 
 
In those articulations the outside reality is considered 
'unmediated' and 'natural,' while virtuality, conceived either 
transparent as if in VR installation or opaque in 
hypermediated computer interface, is always 'mediated,' 
'artificial' and subjective. Consequently, virtuality is often 
presented as the experience lived in between the relation of 
the unforeseen means with the foreseen capabilities of 
thought.    
 
Virtuality is never thought as 'real virtuality,' but always 
contemplated as a 'virtual reality' that is associated with an 
inauthenticity, unreality, falsity and an 'electronic 
irrealism' while contemplating a presence, it is an a priori 
condition to an absence. When the conditions that postulate 
virtuality disappears, virtuality is also forced to disappear. 
An absence of its presence is always reserved for the virtual 
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subject. Thus, virtuality becomes the interplay within the 
media where it is both mediated and actualized however never 
expressed as a reality in. 
 
2.2. Critical Approaches to Virtuality  
The conception of virtuality, when rendered both as an object 
and a subject within the logecentric technological framework, 
becomes subjected to Cartesian recuperations. Once being 
presented as the opposite condition of reality, virtuality is 
discussed only within the dualistic modal of thinking based on 
the semantic interface of binary oppositions. The condition of 
virtuality is grounded in a dualism between absence/presence, 
inside/outside, material/immaterial, natural/artifice, which 
are postulated as one state of actualization in 
relation/opposition to the other.  
 
As discussed only as a technological reproduction modal, and 
foregrounded as an ontological existence in opposition to a 
reality in the logocentric framework, virtuality is often 
postulated as a problematic subject to be discussed within 
various media studies2. It would be possible to state some of 
the contemporary critiques addressed to virtual reality's 
technological, social and cultural implications. After all the 
purpose is to present how these criticisms are mostly working 
within the same mechanisms of thought which they intend to 
criticize. It can be implored how these criticisms extensively 
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utilize the dialectical logic and therefore are subjected to 
fall into the same consequences they intend to criticize. It 
is important to note that, these criticisms are only 
addressing virtuality in the evolution of communication and 
computer technologies. Virtuality, when considered as ontology 
of representation within the framework of technology, is 
positioned as a medium that necessarily follows a progressive, 
and evolutionary logic in a historical trajectory. 
  
These criticisms can be summarized under three aspects that 
can be examined as critical concomitant pervasive readings of 
the varios characters of technology. Yet, it is important here 
to note that there is the limited conception of technology 
only as praxis, as prosthesis, an instrument, or a medium with 
its promises and anticipated effects. Technology as 
'prosthesis' approach can be considered as a translation of 
the social and cultural desire for mediation. A mediation is 
foregrounded with its precursive character, entailing an 
organization of meaning that is trapped within the 
predetermination of a modal or theory. Accordingly, technology 
is projected as the maternal desire to construct or locate an 
essence for virtuality and virtuality is argued as a subject 
that is embodied within the communication technologies, 
partakes the logic of being a conduit, a metaphor that is 
critically functioning within the mechanism as an utopian 
disclosure posed on this conception of technology. 
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These categories can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Once prescribed as a new path of an escape route from the 
constrains of the embodied reality, virtuality is thought as a 
hallmark of a romanticism that is a flight from the oppressive 
character of social, political and cultural restrictions. 
Therefore it is presented as an old dream for establishing 
rational social control over space, information and identity 
(Hillis). 
 
Virtuality is considered as a search for an ideal existence, 
for a better being other than human, an even better copy of 
real within a closed system, based on mathematical modals and 
engineering methods. There is the desire for immaterialization 
that gives birth to virtuality.  
 
2. Virtuality is often thought as an extension of Western 
metaphysics, a transcendental identity politics that is always 
after facilitating new signification systems for 
transgression. The Cartesian split of being and having based 
on the famous mind/body separation is therefore thought as a 
nostalgia for ‘leaving the body behind,’ for the sake of 
becoming pure information. This desire is articulated as a 
desire for becoming the author of your own ontological ground. 
An attempt for erasing the question of origin, but just in 
reverse ending up with extensively multiplying it (Kirby). 
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While an epistemological position is reserved for the ‘self,’ 
the desire for creating the emphatical displacement is 
hypermediated. The self becoming a series of other possible 
points of view is encapsulated in the identity politics that 
is grounded onto an incompleteness based on a conception of 
lack, an ontological projection for being other, but repressed 
within a Cartesian dissolution referring to an omnipresent 
transcendental ego. Cartesian duality and the dichotomous 
logic are presented as multiplying each other through 
different systems of mediation within technology.  
 
3. Virtuality is considered as a new medium operating within 
the same ideological nature of former media. As David Bolter 
has noted, there is the sense of "presentness"-not exactly a 
conviction of the world's presence to us, but of our presence 
to it, in which the desire to express one's self through media 
(language) predates long before the development of digital 
media (Remediation 234-235).  There is always the mechanism of 
a dialectics that remediated the self to itself with the aid 
of a certain level of technology. The subjectivity becoming 
what is presented to the self during this mediation opens "the 
route to conviction in reality through the acknowledgement of 
the endless presence of the self" (Remediation 234). The world 
registered as object (of mimesis) and the user as subject (of 
expression) then point to a transcendental identity politics 
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that is based on the (represented) distance between subject-
object dichotomy. A critical distance is both secured and 
transcendent. There is the presentation of an environment 
where a user can either pass through a window 'enter' into the 
immersion of the represented world, or the subjects and 
objects of representation can come up through the window and 
incorporate the viewer. A dialectics of an exercise that is 
merely a (re)mediation since illusionist painting, realistic 
photography, cinema, television and virtual reality 
installations. A conception of language that is based on 
technology of the medium is after all continuously presenting 
the self to itself (Bolter). 
 
After all the intention in this thesis is to open the 
discussion of virtuality into a broader perspective. While 
trying to avoid the immutable, limited and fixed 
characteristics of the concepts that partake in the discussion 
of technology, it would be possible to articulate on 
virtuality not only as a subject or object conceived within 
digital technologies. Virtuality can be accepted merely as an 
"image of thought"3, a concept which is not bound to any 
taxonomical vocabulary exercising a dichotomous mechanism for 
producing meanings. Therefore it should not be accepted as an 
incarnation of certain praxis within the dynamics of the 
medium where it is represented. After all the technological 
framework that postulates virtuality should not be approached 
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in its inferiority that is addressing a distinct natural 
difference between speaking through digital technologies and 
speaking through the very technology of the body. Therefore 
when we speak of technology of virtuality, it would be an 
inadequate response to immediately consider the only 
conception of virtuality within the digital technologies, and 
dismiss the very nature of the intrinsic relations that 
involve within each other. Languages, mathematical orders, and 
all visual and verbal signification systems are 
indistinguishably intertwined within each other and subjected 
to a differentiation from one another with their capability of 
addressing the complexity of the relations that each can 
represent within their system. As each language will conceive 
a different conception of virtuality within its own 
conformity, virtuality becomes a mysterious conception that 
corresponds to the very nature of the undefined, unforseen 
relations as well. 
 
3. THE VIRTUALITY OF THE VIRTUAL 
The technological conception of virtuality as a theory or 
praxis should not be a discussion about the essence of 
virtuality. In fact in these conceptions the essence of 
virtuality is not even virtual, but instead correspond to a 
realization of a possibility in the name of virtuality. The 
sole purpose in this study is not to trace the ontological 
constitution of the virtual subject, or to reappropriate a 
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position for the virtual object in a philosophical context and 
neither is to deconstitute the technological conception of 
virtuality in relation to other figures of thought. 
Virtuality, as discussed before, can be accepted as a social, 
historical and cultural investment in which virtuality is 
always positioned at an imaginary distance, to be rendered as 
an unreality, a fictive state. However a variety of 
conceptions of virtuality can be grasped while thinking along 
different vocabularies which can construct a multitude of 
other relations under the influence of the concepts introduced 
by philosophies of Spinoza, H. Bergson, G. Deleuze, and J. 
Rajchman.  
 
Deleuzian concept of virtuality suggests a motif of his 
philosophical thinking modal which has different traces in 
different texts written by him. It is a mode of engagement 
with virtuality in order not to discuss it only as a 
vocabulary of an application of a virtual ‘thing,’ but to 
acquire it as an underlying figure that constructs new 
concepts and releases further meanings from existing 
articulations. An application of virtuality, an actualization 
is thus not a method or a modal of a logic like the Cartesian 
thinking or Hegelian Aufhebung that produces concepts in order 
to transcend them. Concepts in the dichotomous modal, become 
subjects at stake, as they are always kept at their finitude 
in order to secure a position for their essence. After all 
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virtuality unsettles the distinction between concepts and 
therefore provides a plurality while multiplying their 
relations with each other.  
 
Virtuality introduces a new conception for concepts. Concepts 
do become intertwined disparities operating in an informal 
plan of thought. Virtuality projects concepts as 'meta-stable' 
constructs (Gilbert Simondon) that change themselves along 
with the definition of their individual components (Rajchman, 
Deleuze Connections 58). They do not embody relativism, but 
instead compose an incomplete and indefinite structure in 
order not to fall into a conventional way of subjectification. 
Each of them continuously invents new meanings within its 
architecture and therefore posits a potentiality through 
differentiation. Concepts do territoralize, deterritoralize 
and reterritoralize at the same time within an immanent 
topography of thought in relation to each other.  
 
As J. Rachman traces, this is a logic of "complication" based 
on an infinite neighboring of the differences of concepts in a 
continuous differentiation yielding certain vagueness (Deleuze 
Connections 61). This vagueness always provide them a 
structure in continuous experimentation, "a freshness of what 
has not been made definite by habit or law" within its 
existing structure (Deleuze Connections 55). Concepts do 
occupy certain coexistence and preexistence with each other, 
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and as their conceptions start to get away from 
subjectifications with fixed discursive regularities, the 
relation in between them become a "nondialectizable" one which 
suggest an opening to the dichotomous logic (Deleuze 
Connections 50). Virtuality becomes an unforseen force for 
extending the relation happening in between the concepts, and 
to open a path to perceive what was not foreseen, and to sense 
what was indiscernible at the moment of thinking.  
 
Therefore the conception of virtuality should not be abridged 
only as a confrontation with the existing vocabulary of 
reality, and neither should be presented as an attempt to 
become both its critique and advocate, to either diagnose or 
celebrate. Virtuality is considered as a concept providing an 
opening out from itself, from its technological connotations 
to the point where it becomes beside itself. While 
articulating within these concepts, it will be possible to 
confront with the vocabulary used in the technological 
conception of virtual. As these concepts will inevitably 
recall the technocentric articulations of virtuality, these 
are not going to be accepted as rival opinions or extensional 
conditions that necessarily embody limitations. On the 
contrary they will be translated from the virtual character of 
virtuality that is in a continuous state of becoming a 
conception in different trajectories. Here, virtuality is not 
going to be thought only with certain figures, methods and 
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concepts, but also by, for, and along with concepts that 
differenciate along their way of becoming themselves. 
 
These concepts can be suggested as follows: 
 
Virtual-Actual, Real-Possible 
Difference-Differenciation 
Concept, The Plane of Immanence 
Multiplicity  
Duration (Time-Space) 
Body 
Event  
Natural-Artificial and Technology 
 
Given these concepts, it is possible to articulate on how 
these concepts can be thought under the influence of the 
conception of virtuality. As each conception can only be 
experienced in relation to other figurations, and as each 
thought can only be grasped always in correlation to former 
thought in the flux of thinking, this study aims to consider 
these different concepts as openings to the discussion of 
virtuality. Virtuality, here, can be observed in its singular 
conception that is always in a line of becoming in relation to 
other components of thought. The nature of differenciation, 
and bifurcation through other conceptions, other images of 
thought does not privilege a singular appearance, a unique 
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conception and force the others to a disappearance. Instead, 
within different texts of Deleuze and Bergson it is possible 
to observe how the nature of concepts ascribes an 
incompleteness and uncertainty.  
 
Therefore, in this study, these concepts are not introduced to 
locate different traces within auxiliary meanings, rather they 
aim to present the topography of thought in how 
differentiation itself becomes subjected to virtuality. As 
Deleuzian concepts may show different confrontations within 
different contexts, this should not be regarded as an attempt 
to prescribe a certain understanding for virtuality, but only 
find a reservoir for the aggregate of meanings under different 
orientations. The becoming of a concept secures a fluidity of 
a continuous flow, which rejects certain temporalizations that 
determine the state of meaning of a concept. Concepts always 
increase their linkages and populate further connections. 
Therefore, it is not aimed to interfere with this continuous 
accumulation of thought to suppose a particular conception of 
virtuality. Besides, it is not intended to limit virtuality 
only to a concept or only to a vague assemblage of thought 
that is concerned with the limits of other conceptions. As 
virtuality signifies both an irregular heterogeneity and a 
precise consistency in different texts, there is the intention 
to witness different confrontations of virtuality during its 
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infinite movement, at its infinite speed within this different 
layers of thought.  
 
It is possible to state that Deleuze starts with an 
articulation of virtuality, which he borrows from Bergson and 
then let it becoming a concept through different 
actualizations of thought. Virtuality ceases to become while 
passing through its components marks new territories and 
simultaneously becomes inseparable from its constructs. When 
Deleuze states "In its production and reproduction, the 
concept has the reality of the virtual" the virtual becomes a 
necessary state of the affairs that conceptualize the concept 
(What is Philosophy 159). Besides virtuality becomes the 
'meanwhile,' the time of the ‘event’ in its passes, the 
composite becoming character of the event. It becomes the 
relation, the variable and the function, at the same time, the 
simultaneously intersecting virtual character with itself, 
inseparable yet independent encountering effectuation beside 
itself.  
 
The virtual character reserved for virtuality in Deleuzian 
conception releases a multitude of characters in which none of 
them are left definite and complete enough to suggest a 
delimition for the virtual concept in a precision. Therefore I 
find it important to discuss virtuality not in with a certain 
organization of these concepts listed above, but instead try 
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to present virtuality's confrontations with these concepts in 
Deleuzian Philosophy. These confrontations may then reveal a 
more comprehensive background for the discussion of virtuality 
that is operating in a series of bifurcations that 
continuously expand and contract through different directions, 
diagrams new pathways, releases further considerations that 
maintain with each other. Virtual reveals the plane of little 
commas that infinitely multiplies its finitude, in which 
difference is differenciated, actualized, but relentlessly not 
realized. 
 
3.1.  Virtual-Actual, Real-Possible 
The word ‘virtual’ dates back to use of the word virtus, 
"meaning potential, or force" (Rajchman, Constructions 115). 
Deleuze traces the nature of virtuality from Bergson's 
philosophy in which virtuality becomes a distinction from 
possibility. Possibility is considered as an opposition to 
reality, and on the contrary virtuality thought in relation to 
actuality. In which possibility disguises an actuality whereas 
virtuality a reality. Deleuze cites Proust's formulation for 
virtuality as "real without being actual, but as such posses 
an actuality" (Cinema 2 82). The process of realization is 
subject to two rules for Deleuze, one of resemblance and 
another of limitation. The real is supposed to be in the 
completely given image of the possible, in which "from the 
view of the concept, there is no difference between the 
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possible and the real" (Bergsonism 97). As every possible is 
not realized, realization involves a limitation in which some 
possibles are repulsed or thwarted and while others pass into 
real. "For in order to be actualized, the virtual cannot 
proceed by elimination or limitation (of its capacity), but 
must create its own (creative) line of actualizations in 
positive acts" (Bergsonism 96). The actual does not resemble 
with the virtuality it embodies.  
 
"It is difference that is primary in the process of 
actualization- the difference between the virtual form which 
we begin, and the actuals at we arrive, and also the 
difference between the complementary lines according to which 
actualization takes place" (Bergsonism 97). The characteristic 
of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized 
by creating its own lines of differenciation from itself. 
 
For Deleuze, "we give ourselves that is ready made, preformed, 
pre-existent to itself and that will pass into existence 
according to an order of successive limitations" (Bergsonism 
98). And as this is a backwards projection, the possible is 
only the (sterile) doubling of the fictitious image of the 
real bounded to a resemblance which does not suggest a 
differentiation or a mechanism of creation. As everything is 
already completely given, realization is only a confrontation 
with the pseudo-actuality of the possible. On the other hand 
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actualization is a generation at all levels with all tensions. 
And the favoring of the virtual against the possible is to 
release this constructive character. It is to conceive 
variations through differentiation. Despite this is a 
differentiation that is an intrinsic character to the virtual, 
virtuality develops itself by differentiation, creates its 
lines of divergence, and attains to its heterogeneous 
character that actualizes itself along a ramified series. The 
lines of divergence correspond to a particular degree in the 
virtual totality, a co-existence within the virtuality and 
thus, virtuality actualizes its level while separating the 
difference between the lines, and yet it embodies the 
"prominent points while being unaware of everything that 
happens on other levels" (Bersonism 100-101). 
"For what coexisted within the virtual ceases to coexist 
in the actual and is distributed in lines or parts that 
cannot be summed up, each one retaining the whole, 
except from a certain perspective, from a certain point 
of view. These lines of differentiation are therefore 
truly creative: They only actualize by inventing, they 
create in these conditions the physical, vital or 
physical representative of the ontological level that 
they embody" (Bergsonism 101). 
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3.2. Difference and "Differenciation" 
It is important at this point to note on the nature of 
difference. It is a matter of discussing how differentiation 
is conceptualized within the constructive philosophy that 
produces the creative divergence of the virtuality. Is there a 
divergence in degree or in kind? The separation and the 
distancing mechanism of differentiation needs to be elaborated 
in order to confront with the nature of virtuality. It is 
important to deal with questions as such: How the 
heterogeneous character of virtuality maintains its necessary 
consistency? How virtuality indetermines itself while 
enveloping its difference? How a distancing becomes a 
continuous movement between in degree and in kind? The concept 
of difference is an important example in presenting how 
Deleuze opens a path from the Bergson's dualism in which 
Bergson experiences his method of "intuition" (Bergsonism 38), 
to divide the composite according to its natural 
articulations. This can also be accepted as an articulation on 
the concept of representation in which how two component 
elements are experienced as a deteoriation. Two pure presences 
(in kind) do not allow themselves to be represented, rather 
they experience an interpenetration within each other and 
becomes subjected to a continuous of exchange of their 
substances. 
 
 31 
The composite is divided according to qualitative and 
quantitative tendencies in which Bergson presents two kinds of 
differentiation: Differences in kind and differences in degree 
in which differences in degree show the lowest degree of 
difference, and difference in kind show the highest form of 
difference. Deleuze's reading of Bergson on the concept of 
difference provided him with his critique on the Bergsonian 
conception of intensity which he found "unconvincing" 
(Difference and Repetition 239). Deleuze's main criticism lies 
behind a very basic inquiry: 'is there a difference in kind or 
degree, between differences of degree and differences in 
kind?' While suggesting 'Neither' as an answer Deleuze states 
a third characteristic in which intensity is an implicated 
quantity that is not implicated in quality whereas it is 
implicated in itself. Both "implicating and implicated". 
Intensity is suggested as "neither divisible, like extensive 
quality, nor indivisible like, quality" (Difference and 
Repetition 237). It is formulated as follows: "by the relative 
determination of a unit (this unit itself never being 
indivisible but only marking the level at which division 
ceases); by the equivalence of the parts determined by the 
unit; by the consubstantiality of the parts which the whole is 
divided" (Difference and Repetition 237). There an intensive 
quality may be divided, but not without changing its nature, 
there is the indivisible character where no part exists prior 
to the division and no part retains the same nature after 
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division. Deleuze replies to Bergsonian critique of intensity 
with stating the presupposition that Bergson ordered. Deleuze 
points that Bergson assumes qualities ready-made, and 
extensities already constituted. "Difference is a matter of 
degree only within the extensity in which it is explicated; it 
is a matter of kind only with regard to the quality which 
covers it within that extensity. Between the two are the all 
degrees of difference-in other words the intensive" 
(Difference and Repetition 239). However Deleuze presents an 
illusion, a movement in which difference in intensity is 
cancelled. A cancellation that is merely outside itself, "in 
extensity and underneath quality" (Difference and Repetition 
237). This is a movement in its two aspects: the two orders of 
implication or degradation. A primary implication designating 
the state in which intensity is implicated in itself, and 
there is the secondary implication which designates the state 
in which intensities are enveloped by qualities and extensity 
which explicate them. It is in the secondary implication (or 
degradation) in which differences in intensity is cancelled, 
the highest rejoining the lowest; and a primary power of 
degradation in which the highest affirms the lowest" 
(Difference and Repetition 240). Deleuze points the confusion 
between these two instances (of the extrinsic and intrinsic 
states) merely as the source of this illusion that obliterates 
the difference in degrees on the surface while differentiation 
differentiates within all its aspects. 
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It is possible to consider differenciation as the infinite 
movement, the actualization of virtuality whereas it is the 
intrinsic character of virtuality that diverts the character 
of difference in a continuous unfolding between a difference 
in quality and a difference in intensity. It is the virtual 
plateau where the true difference in between belongs to 
neither. It is the virtual passage from one quality to the 
other, where there is the "phenomena of delay", "the whole 
play of conjunctions and disjunctions", "resemblance and 
continuity", and the double genesis of quality and extensity 
that change their nature while dividing (Difference and 
Repetition 238-239). If one proceeds on what has disappeared 
on the other it is the "virtual multiplicity", it is the 
qualitative duration that retains the double character during 
the degrees of expansion and contraction. Virtuality 
ceaselessly becomes the entire nature of difference, the 
fundamental illusion of differentiation. Difference in its 
virtual splitting then becomes unbounded, uncoordinated, and 
avoids becoming a moment of contradiction, or negation. 
Differentiation in its infinite movement acquires its power of 
affirmation. According to Deleuze it is only betrayed by the 
figures of quantitative and qualitative opposition. 
"Limitation and opposition are first and second dimension 
surface effects, whereas the living depths, the diagonal, is 
populated by differences without negation" (Bergsonism 97). It 
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is the virtuality of the difference that accumulates through 
the actualization of the differential positings. It is only 
the antinomy of representation that fixes the propitious 
moment of differenciation to a ground, for an appropriation, 
subordination to a resemblance, however it is virtuality, that 
designate an avoidance to representation, which precedes the 
transcendental illusion by not returning the marks of 
limitation and contradiction. Virtuality actualizes ungrounded 
affirmations and indeterminations, and not the distribution of 
differences, which is a manner entirely dependent on the 
requirements of the excluding character of representation. The 
world of representation establishes the ground to substitute 
the identical to become the internal character of 
representation itself for Deleuze; therefore the identical now 
expresses a claim which must in turn be grounded. However the 
ground of the virtual is an infinite 'ungrounding' which 
renders representation into an infinite delay. Identical 
becomes non-individuated, impersonal, dismembered within the 
infinite differenciation and virtuality becomes decentered 
from its resemblance operating under the mechanisms of 
representation. 
 
3.3. The Concept & The Plane of Immanence 
Deleuze argues that philosophy is a 'constructivism' that has 
two qualitatively different aspects, the creation of concepts 
and laying out a 'plane.' Concepts are the assemblages, the 
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configurations of a machine, but the plane is the abstract 
machine of which these assemblages are the working parts. The 
plane is the absolute horizon that provides the concepts with 
their singular character and secures their conceptual 
linkages. The plane of immanence is not a concept, but instead 
the image of thought for Deleuze, the image thought that gives 
itself of what it means to think. "It retains only what 
thought can claim by right, the only moment that can be 
carried to infinity" (What is Philosophy 37). It is the 
horizon that is in movement, the relative horizon is at an 
infinite movement by a coming and going, which can only 
advance to a destination while turning back to itself. A 
double movement, a reversibility, folding from one to the 
other in which thinking and being are said to be one and the 
same. "A single speed on both sides" (What is Philosophy 21). 
Unlike the Cartesian Cogito that substances the being 
investing on the separation. The movement towards the 
infinite, concerns every moment passing through the whole 
plane of immanence both folding onto itself and also folding 
other moments or allowing itself to be folded by them. Deleuze 
state a difference in nature between the plane and concepts.  
 
At this point it can be regarded useful to suggest a special 
consideration for the double character of virtuality as a 
quasi-concept. Virtuality is not only the concept but at the 
same time the nature of relation that suggests the description 
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(but not the prescription) of the plane of immanence, the 
ground where there is the infinite movement of the conceptions 
operating. Virtuality is an incomplete image of thought that 
sets the indeterminable, yet consistent relation among the 
concepts. There is the immanent kernel in between the plane of 
immanence and the concepts. It is a philosophical tool, the 
complicated machine, which installs the concepts only with 
their virtuality, institutes a plane of immanence, a horizon, 
with its virtual difference within its crystalline image. By 
reactivating certain parts of concepts, and while leaving the 
prescribed figurations, virtuality renders them visible during 
their becomings into multiplicities, perceives the virtual 
derivatives in them and thus, suggest a continuous expansion 
for the immanent plane. As the "plane of immanence is only 
immanent to itself," virtuality can be posited as only virtual 
to itself (What is Philosophy 45). It opens a free diagram of 
indetermination to the strict correspondence between the 
established concepts and the instituted plane. Virtuality is 
not only a before, a 'preconcept,' for explaining the creation 
of the concepts; nor is only a 'preplane,' for corresponding 
to the becoming immanent of the plane that sets the geography, 
the map for the concepts. Therefore it is possible to consider 
the preexistence and coexistence in between, not a restoration 
for any externality between the plane and its concepts, but 
reserving an immersence for the immanent plane for the thought 
and unthought. As Deleuze puts, the plane of immanence is the 
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non thought in the thought, virtuality attends to the relation 
(but not the method) in between the "non-external outside" and 
the "not-internal inside"- and the unlocalizable 
differentiation. The becoming of a concept, which continuously 
virtualizes with itself, incarnates with its own image of 
thought, through the plane of immanence. Virtuality is the 
crystalline concept laid upon the plane of immanence, the 
movement of the infinitude, the speed that virtualizes the 
finite moments of the concepts, besides it is the special 
construction that virtualizes each concept, turning them back 
to their fragmentary surface. Virtuality is thus the character 
of the ground, the deterritoralization that creates the 
concepts with their virtual difference. It is the 
philosophical that lies in between the philosophical and the 
nonphilosophical, inbetween the concept creation, concept and 
the instituting plane. A virtuality that essentially addresses 
to infinite thinking, not for an appearance of a 
determination, but on the contrary to renounce the 
virtualization of the finitude, to force it fold differently, 
to continually free it from its ordinates to attain the 
infinite speed. Virtual becomes the trace of the variable 
contours inscribed on the plane, 'the incessant exchange' 
necessary for not substituting the constitution with the 
constituted. A virtualization is a conception never at rest; 
becomes a seamless actualization turning everything into 
virtuality with innumerable actualities. 
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3.4.  Multiplicity 
The virtual is a concept of "multiplicity". As a new image of 
thought, its Deleuze's "nondialectizable" logic, "a logic of 
sense and event" instead of "a logic of predication and truth" 
about identities, categories and propositions (Deleuze 
Connections 50). Multiplicity is the very nature of the 
concept, the realm of seamless discursive differenciation, a 
‘thinking’ for getting away with the "illusions of recognition 
and representation.” It is the constructive logic of the 
incomplete open wholes constituted with indefinite components 
that differ more freely without falling into categorization of 
discrete or continuous variation. 
 
Multiplicitiy is not a quantitative description of a set, or a 
whole that is composed of ‘many’ substances which show variety 
in nature, but instead multiplicities are made denumerable 
singularities, infinitely neighboring differences without 
being any ‘instantiation’ or ‘specification’ such as a 
particularity or identity. As Rajchman traces from Deleuze, 
these are 'impure,' mixing elements from many different 
species, which are yet left unresolved to release the force of 
differenciation. It is a differenciation logic for the 
multiplicity that cannot be reduced only to a 'differing' or 
divergence, but should also be considered as convergence, the 
way of 'connecting' singularities in a plan of consistency for 
reserving what makes them as singular. 
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Following Rajchman, this is a logic of abstraction with a 
logical operator "and" that is always connecting singularities 
within the geography of indistincition and which works prior 
to the operator "is" that ordinate predications or identity 
that attribute oppositions or contradictions (Deleuze 
Connections 57). 
 
As the conception of multiplicity reserves an ontological 
indetermination for itself, it secures a 'vagueness,' for 
inferring any truth from others. This is a vagueness operating 
on a precision by 'inventing differenciation' procreating 
through unexpected ways. This is the nondialectizable nature 
of multiplicity that is neither a ‘switching of truth-values’ 
for moving to a higher stage in dialectics, nor an "undoing 
for identities to claim utilization of differences to 
unresolve, destabilize totalities, metastructures and 
metanarratives. Instead multiplicity is the ontological 
indetermination for restless 'destitution' for 'being.' 
 
This is the strange geography of the multiplicity where there 
is the real logic of virtuality operating under different 
figurations of difference. Virtuality is thus the nature of 
the multiplicity against the problem of differentiation from 
'realism.' Realism is mostly posed as the problem of 
classification, setting a taxonomy for relations that subsist 
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under distinction represented as real against unreal, true 
against false…and etc. However the reality of the virtual 
comes by the invention of the indistinguishable, the 
unforeseen power of not deciding about the instance of 
difference. Virtuality is preexistence prior to any language 
of judgement. It is not the consequences of this 
indetermination between the categories, which insist on the 
virtual character of the multiplicity, but instead it is the 
logical flow of creation that bifurcate its paths through 
virtualization.  
 
The conception of multiplicity should not be considered only 
as an assurance for an infinite construct of affirmation, or a 
substitute for the disbelief resonating against Cartesian 
certainty, reductionism (as) negation. This would still be an 
attempt to reserve an ontological predicate for its being only 
to have it available to affirm an already established 
proposition. The virtual character of multiplicity deduces 
multiplicity from any realization, any assertional way of 
thinking that would only condition it towards a backward 
projection, a resemblance by and for itself. Rather this is to 
open multiplicity to its immanent character that actualizes 
its finitude within its singular character. The logic of the 
multiplicity is an encounter with the logic of virtual to 
definite the 'inattributable' character prior to any 
association with reality. Virtual thus belongs to the language 
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of the multiplicity, a language ‘not yet spoken,’ ‘never 
completely understood.’ This is another language pronounced by 
Deleuze, that is suspending any syntactic ties with presence, 
but nevertheless capable of expressing the inattributable 
character of becoming.  
 
Virtuality is the multiplicity, that destitute the language of 
the 'be' and it is therefore the improper language of the 
virtual that subsists through a ramification on a contingent 
encounter with multiplicity. Therefore the logic of the 
multiplicity is to conceive speaking through the (language of) 
virtual as virtualization, to confront with the obstinate 
illusion of 'language as being' and 'being as language' with a 
logic avoiding the 'is' operator.  
 
It is important at this stage to note, how Deleuze traverses 
between the concepts that have been constructed throughout his 
philosophy. Concepts are not absolute propositions for him, 
and instead of ceasing to define a contour for them, he treats 
them as absolute surfaces of thought in which contours are 
created at an infinite speed. This infinity may be faster or 
slower (contracting or expanding) in speed where the 
thresholds, the components of the concepts traverse with each 
other. Therefore concepts become indistinct from each other, 
and this inseparability becomes not a matter of linking 
propositions together, but to open them to a unity of thought, 
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to a state of perpetuity, that is nothing, but a virtuality. 
It is the character of 'multiplicity' that shares the same 
line of meaning with the concept 'duration.' Thus, it is 
virtuality that prevents the concepts falling into a 
discursive constitution. Virtuality is not a way to fix a 
correlation between them. Deleuze finds no reason for them to 
cohere, they should be left as resonating figures (of 
vibration) inside a virtuality in which the bridges between 
the concepts are set to an infinite mobility that is never at 
rest (What is Philosophy 23). Consequently, each concept that 
is mentioned throughout this chapter ceases to become each 
other and differenciate. Virtuality becomes not only the 
immanent character in each of them, but also the complex whole 
that they are experiencing being a part of. 
 
It is possible to find the different elucidation of the same 
figures of thought under different texts. Or the same concepts 
would show variations, nuances under different figurations. 
Deleuze sees them as ‘unforseen’ variations that can be 
considered as confrontations with the necessary 
'reactivations' of the same concept within the immanent 
structure. This is a virtual conversation that Deleuze held 
within the concepts. Concepts neglect their state of being, 
and become senses of their expression through each other. 
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Virtual, Actual, Real, Possible, Difference, Differenciation, 
Concept, the Plane of Immanence, Multiplicity, Duration are a 
series thought, which are utilized in reflecting the nature of 
the conception of a concept. These can be regarded as the 
expressions (instead of formations) which posit a certain kind 
of incorporeality for the 'corpus' of a concept. For example 
as discussed in this chapter, although the concept of concept 
has new considerations in Deleuzian vocabulary, it refutes any 
foregrounding as 'being' a recognizable construct that 
establishes an ontology for conception of concepts. Deleuze's 
philosophy is a perpetual 'creation of concepts' and this 
creation is neither a refurbishing for any existing concept in 
order to reappropriate it for a subject to a particular kind 
of postulation, nor is a creation based on inventing new 
abstract words that contradict with any former establishment 
as a concept. Deleuze philosophy is not a commitment to 
deconstitute any critique on the history of creating concepts, 
but merely an inquiry that foregrounds the inferiority of any 
critique that bases itself on discussing the inadequacy of a 
certain concept. This inadequacy is endowed in two ways. First 
of all, it is foregrounded by the critique itself; the 
critique operates necessarily on an illusionary limit that 
asserts a contour, fixes a façade on the seamless surface of a 
concept to discuss it in relation to a particular problem. 
This can be considered as an act of realization, a limitation 
derived from the realm of possibilities for the concept. There 
 44 
is a quasi-exteriority postulated against the concept, an 
attempt of adequation, and a move of dissolution that thinks 
both for and against the concept. Although there is the 
inconspicuous line of demarcation between the ‘for’ and 
‘against,’ inside and outside of the concept, there is this 
very conception of a border, a limit that is figured, but 
obliterated at the same time. The limit is always deferred, 
but the idea of the limit, the idea of the idea, becomes 
necessarily an investment posed on to the subject of 
differentiation that is only considered operating between the 
possible and the impossible. But what is the idea of an idea, 
if there 'is' nothing as the assertion of the lexical 'being,' 
the 'is,' to language. If the body of the language is already 
deprived from it's being. If the constitution of a 'word,' 
merely points only to a fluidity of meaning at the slippery 
surface of thought. If virtuality is always contemplated by 
the very language itself at each attempt of figuring a thought 
when each fixation correspond not to a temporality but solely 
to virtuality. 
 
As the logic of virtuality does not operate with 'is' and 'is 
not's. Virtualities do not correspond to any complete 
finalized conception, but only point multiplicities that are 
put in relation to other multiplicities. As Rajchman notes, 
Deleuze introduces a difference to any schematism of 
representation. The relation between signs is not considered 
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semiotic, but "procedural" (Deleuze Connections  69). Signs 
are not prescribed by codes, and instead instrumentalize 
experimentation in linking form and matter, word and image. As 
this is a differenciation from Platonic conception of techne, 
signs are considered, as assemblages of meaning no longer tied 
to predeterminations. 
 
Thus, virtuality corresponds to the 'becoming' body of a 
language, the infinite movement that avoids any suppression, 
but becomes an enunciation for the language itself. Language 
becomes the realm of the seamless intensification as 
virtuality. All thinking, all figuration does not correspond 
to a repression, a suspension of virtuality, but an 
actualization that prevents virtuality acting as a closure to 
itself. Otherwise, conceptions of virtuality do not become 
merely associated with a 'tracing' for any reminiscent 
components (or opponents) of thought throughout a history, but 
in fact tracing becomes a virtuality, when traces becomes 
infinite differenciations enfolding with other traces, 
movements of contractions and expansions within the same 
perplexed architecture. 
 
Furthermore, concepts become delimited if they are vexed for a 
certain plane of thought addressed to a particular problem 
(i.e. Descarian Cogito: I think, therefore I am). This is an 
involvement with an actualization for the concept from the 
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virtuality of the plane of immanence towards a plane reflected 
by the existence of its thinker. A confrontation with a 
particular plane that is a temporary settlement, a mark for a 
territory, a contraction within the infinite spatialization of 
the thought. This is an incompleteness that is sincere to any 
actualization. Any claim of thought that resembles itself 
becomes an actualization of its virtuality. Despite, it is the 
becoming of a thought in its virtual history that avoids its 
resembling to itself, and releases the forces of 
differenciation from itself. There is the incapacity, 
impotency reserved for the thought that undetermines itself. 
This second kind of inadequacy is due to a reliance on 
presuppositions, due to a dependence on the nature of thinking 
itself.  
 
Deleuze reminds us a disappearance for the concept when it is 
germinated on a foreign soil. An idea based on the 
reactivation of another is merely pointing an erasure. This is 
an erasure experienced both from the inside and outside, both 
from the actual components of the concepts that annul 
themselves if they left inadequate to address the problem in 
different conditions (under different planes of thought), and 
an erasure when the new concept positions itself by 
deconstituting the reminiscent components of the former one.  
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Deleuze shows how a concept alters its nature (either breaks 
apart, or undergoes a complete change) if interrupted by 
another exterior component. He gives the example how Kantian 
Cogito, was different than Descartes's, and how Kant demanded 
an introduction of a new component (of which he considers that 
was repressed by Descartes) to establish a ground for 
constructing his conception of the ‘thinking substance’ in 
relation to a presence of a concept such as time. However 
Kant's notion of time is not the same concept which 
Descartes's time is anterior with, Kant is therefore 
submitting an erasure to Descarets's Cogito before 
reactivating it through his own concepts. An absence before 
the presence of the concept is reserved when it is being 
reconsidered or criticized. Therefore, it would be possible to 
note how concepts do not become subservient to the critique, 
but it is the critique that becomes inferior to itself.  
 
What brings about the essential difference of these two kinds 
of inadequacies is the conception of virtuality that 
underwrites them. In the first case, virtuality is repressed 
with a potentiality in order to mark an expansion for the 
limit, the praxis for a limit that relentlessly defers itself 
until a new attempt of handling is introduced when it is 
juxtaposed near another concept. Each concept pretends as a 
transgression for the former one. Virtuality is extracted from 
the conception of a concept to render an opening to a 
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critique, to a philosophy discussing the same concept within 
different components of thought. In the second case, 
virtuality is unavoidably actualized, suspended; conception 
becomes subject to thinking, and left a vulnerability to the 
economy of criticism, to the dichotomous logic.  
 
It would be possible to elaborate on the subject of virtuality 
by continuing with a series of concepts (Duration, Time, 
Space, Body and Event) that need to be observed from this 
point of view. These concepts are not new configurations 
addressed to same problems (differences are already introduced 
by the new problems), nor they are extrapolations within the 
same certainties. It is the philosophy of the virtual that 
secures an incapacity to establish a ground for those concepts 
and again it is virtuality that establishes the inseparability 
among different concepts, the different conceptions for the 
same concept and even different components of meaning within 
the same concept. A double character is reserved for concept. 
"It is absolute, and relative: it is relative to its 
components, to other concepts, to the plane on which it is 
defined, and to the problem it is supposed to solve; but it is 
absolute through the condensation it carries out, the site it 
occupies on the plane, the conditions it assigns to the 
problem" (What is Philosohpy 21). 
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Therefore it is necessary to assume that these latter series 
of concepts are not new considerations, or reconfigurations 
based on the former vocabulary that discuss virtuality from 
the technological framework. They can be accepted as further 
intensifications experiencing infinite reactivations within 
the virtuality of the former concepts. After all the purpose 
is not to posit a move towards a classification among concepts 
or try to establish an ontological ground for a taxonomical 
structure, but to point a differentiation in the complication 
of these concepts different from the former ones. They can be 
conceived as concepts that have different "histories" (What is 
Philosohpy 18). Throughout their history of becoming, they 
correlate and coincide with other concepts, undergo other 
planes, confront with different problems while they witness 
the infinite speed thought. Deleuze sees this as a "co-
creation" within the infinite number of components of a 
concept branched towards other concepts (What is Philosohpy 
18). The concept always ceases to become, so that it should 
necessarily be thought in relation to other concepts. This is 
also defying the logic trapped in between the 'one and the 
multiple,' avoiding the question whether there is one concept, 
or a multitude of concepts.  
 
This is a history not of a 'before and after' relationship, 
but a history happening 'at the same moment' of a 
stratigraphic time (58) releasing the force of virtuality in 
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which concepts differ as creations through their 
differenciations in their speed and movement in thought. 
Deleuze explains this as the becoming of Philosophy, where 
there is the co-existence of concepts, within various planes 
of thought, that do not appear in a succession, but instead as 
a superimposition on a plane of immanence. The history of co-
existence does not presume a true concept that is best or 
worst for a particular system, rather deliberately works 
against restoring any illusion for a transcendence of any 
concept. The plane of immanence is a history of distances: 
distances between thought and the unthought. As Deleuze puts: 
"…(The plane of immanence) is the base of all planes, 
immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed 
in thinking it. It is the most intimate within thought, 
and yet the absolute outside-an outside more distant 
than any internal world because it is an inside deeper 
than any internal world: it is the immanence, 'the 
intimacy as the Outside,' the exterior become the 
intrusion that stifles, and the reversal of both the one 
and the other" (What is Philosohpy 59).  
 
Deleuze's concepts should be discussed always in relation to 
other conceptions for the same concept. This is thinking 
beside itself, alongside others. Instead of actualizing 
concepts from their virtuality, this can be regarded as a 
designation to actualize virtualization itself. This is to 
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juxtapose concepts that have different histories, adjoining a 
differenciation within a history that is immanent to itself. 
This is to resume into the realm of virtuality to release its 
forces not to encounter with a digression, but to think 
through the resonance of co-creation. Instead of folding back 
to a schematism of a singular concept, there is the perplexity 
of the virtuality that reveals the hidden facades of the 
unforseen.  
 
The nature of multiplicity is helpful in understanding how 
Bergson approaches to concepts as compounds which are to be 
experienced by dividing up. However for him this is not a 
matter of diving an indivisible, continuous, nonmeasurable 
whole, but a division that provides a 'dividing in kind,' 
which avoids falling into the contradiction of thinking in 
terms of numerable subdivisions. The concept of multiplicity 
is about seamless division that involves no opposition and 
contradiction. As Deleuze states, multiplicity is not a matter 
of being 'multiple' as opposed to being 'one,' defining one 
state of being as a negative of the other, which would only be 
yielding a theory about a claim to construct a synthesis of 
two. In fact, this should be acknowledged as condemnation of 
such kind of differentiation among beings, which is nothing, 
but a false movement orienting towards a limitation and 
opposition. Thus this is neglecting two kinds of orders 
preoccupying each other, the one that incorporates the 
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multiple, or the multiple that consists the one. This is to 
suggest thinking a priori to the problem of installation of 
'being' one vs. the other, inventing a different trajectory of 
a qualitative differenciation, which cannot be decomposed and 
recombined in quantitative terms. The actualization of a 
multiplicity is to re-allocate irreducability while 
experiencing the virtual totality by seamless infinite 
division and differenciation. 
 
3.5. Duration (Time and Space) 
The infinite movement as the virtual division of multiplicity 
then introduces us to Bergson's concept of "duration". A 
different figuration of temporality based on different 
characterizations of time and space of which can be conceived 
in detail to provide a differenciated understanding for the 
contemporary considerations of virtuality that contemplate on 
virtuality as a geography based on the different sensations 
experienced by different spatialization of time, unlike the 
so-called real one. 
 
"Differenciation is essentially temporal", as Constantine 
Boundas states and this is the time of multiplicity when 
duration constantly actualizes by dividing itself (Boundas 
92). As this is not a quantitative division into decomposing 
distinct instant moments, we are rather compelled to think a 
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division as a differenciation in nature among successive 
segments of a fusion.  
"So that at each moment, everything tends to spread out 
into an instantaneous, indefinitely divisible continuum, 
which will not prolong itself into the next instant, but 
will pass away, only to be reborn in the following 
instant, in a flicker or shiver that constantly begins 
again" (Boundas 93).  
 
As Boundas finds even inappropriate to say what duration 'is,' 
the concept can be considered as a 'becoming' of an incomplete 
heterogeneity that constitutes itself by implicating through 
its segments. Deleuze calls this a "qualitative 
discrimination" which ceases the traditional vocabulary of 
being and contributes to an ontology of the movement of 
becoming in which even duration, defined as a multiplicity at 
the beginning, does not fall into a "confusion of being 
itself." 
 
As the continua of duration is not made of an aggregate of 
moments, there is the succession and simultaneous co-existence 
of the segments that implicate each other. 
 
This is the characterization of time in which the present is 
still becoming and yet it cannot be thought separately from 
becoming past, whereas the past cannot be thought of as being 
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constituted after it has ceased to be present. Deleuze calls 
this as the "Paradox of Co-existence", in which past coexists 
with every new present in relation to which it is past. 
Besides, Boundas adds two more paradoxes to the idiosyncrasy 
of duration: "The paradox of contemporaneity", and the 
"paradox of the survival of the past" in itself. 
 
The former paradox for him, make us to think that past is 
being presupposed by every old and new present and it is 
considered contemporaneous with the present it has been. 
"This is a priori past, which insists in the old present 
and persists in the actual, pre-exists every present in 
general and, as a result, it generate the paradox of 
pre-existence. We are indeed asked to think that the 
entire past preserves itself and therefore, coexists 
with every present. This past has never been present, 
since it cannot be constituted after the constitution of 
the present" (Boundas 92). 
 
The latter paradox brings an ontological difficulty for the 
past as itself, as the present is the contraction of entire 
past conserved in itself, there is the impossibility of the 
past to survive in itself. It is double contingency for the 
past, both being coetaneous and incessant. "It cannot be 
represented, but without it there is no representation" says 
Boundas. There is not a past preceding the present, but only 
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considered as a presupposition for the present without it 
would not happen.  
 
It is in the virtuality of the duration where Deleuze does not 
permit any kind dualism, even in reverence to a monism. 
However there is only an actuality of 'dilation and 
contraction' that becomes the two different aspects of 
differenciation during the actuality of duration. As each 
differenciation (differences in degree and differences in 
kind) would not be accepted completely external to the other 
in terms of two distinguishing not to re-establish a monism 
out of the persisting differenciation, there is the 
coexistence of all differenciation profound within all levels. 
It is the nature of duration where different tendencies of 
differenciation experienced through dilation and contraction, 
in which all degrees (of differenciation) coexist in a 
singular nature. There is the composite virtuality of time in 
which past is reserved in its totality, actualized in a matter 
of contraction and expansion, simultaneously, on all planes. 
Deleuze calls this a "virtual coexistence" and discusses the 
presence of a certain kind of repetition within all the 
degrees of this coexistence. (Bergsonism 60). He suggests that 
this is a virtual repetition occurring not on certain 
elements, but within all the levels of its actualization, in 
which "the whole of our past is played, restarts, and repeats 
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itself, at the same time, on all levels it sketches out" 
(Bergsonism 61). 
  
Duration can not be limited as a different approach to a new 
representation of time. Therefore it should not be understand 
as diagramming a concept of time originating from an intrinsic 
quality that is more expanded and extended form from the point 
of view of an exterior subject (such as space). Rather it is 
possible to consider duration as confrontation with time that 
expresses itself within an infinity of fluxes at each 
successive moment. Duration is thought as a movement of time 
opening itself to a spatialization which is based on "rhythmic 
contractions" and "dilations of varying intensity" (Bergsonism 
103-105). Space and time become indistinguishable but provided 
with different actualizations within the rhythm of 
differenciation. This duality is overcomed by a difference of 
separating the two different coincidences of division and 
differenciation, but releasing two insisting natures through a 
singularity of duration which expresses an undulatory and 
rhythmic virtuality in an intensive manifold.  
 
The virtuality of time provides a plurality of times that are 
not experienced relatively different from external references, 
this coexistence described above, opens to a singularity of a 
time with its type of multiplicity. Time is spatialized in 
such a way that space is not considered ready made, and time 
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is not adapted as a supplementary fourth dimension of it for 
Deleuze. 
 
This is a spatialization in which at the limit of contraction 
there is 'matter' and at the limit of extension there is 'pure 
space.' Matter is not considered as space, but as an extensity 
and space, in fact, is not matter or extension, but the 
representation of the limit where the movement of expansion 
would come to an end as the external envelope of all possible 
extensions. Deleuze considers that "it is not matter, not 
extensity in space, but just the opposite" (Bergsonism 87). 
Extensities are indiscernible from the contractions, and 
duration is never contracted or extended enough to be thought 
independent from the matter where it is acquainted with. The 
nature of the matter is the immanent duration of the relative 
contractions and extensions, all distinct yet qualified 
extensions that are in correlative interruption and dispersion 
with each other to diagram a becoming of space imbued in the 
virtuality of duration. From an infinitely relaxed matter to 
an infinitely contracted space it is an acquaintance with the 
intrinsic movement of a single duration that forms the spatial 
sensation.  
 
Deleuze articulates on the virtuality of time in his book 
"Cinema 2", in which he cites Proust stating that "time is not 
internal to us, but that we are internal to time, which 
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divides itself into two, which loses itself, and discovers 
itself in itself, which makes the present pass, and the past 
preserved" (82-83). Thus, Deleuze continues by stating that 
subjectivity is never ours, but it is time, the virtual. The 
actual is always objective and the virtual is subjective. It 
is the experience of time, which divides itself in two, as 
"affector" and "affected", the affection of self by itself, 
corresponds to definition of time. In addition, time becomes 
an affectionate experience, a movement of sensation extended 
and contracted in varying degrees and styles in the endless 
splitting of the singularity of duration. This is a virtual 
existence of a sensation in accordance with its pure actuality 
(which does not need to be actualized). There is a small 
circuit between time and space where everything becomes a 
certain kind of reciprocal movement in all directions in an 
infinity of ways. 
 
3.6. Body 
Deleuze contemplates on a thinking that adjoins Platonic 
conception of time with Stoic's expression of time, as a 
sensation of an event, through the incorporeality of the body. 
Stoic's thinking is deprived from the conception of body that 
is a ‘being’ as such, but in return, is always a 'becoming' of 
a multiplicity in relation to other bodies. This relation is 
complexity based on composition, recomposition and 
decomposition with other incorporealities. Bodies are 
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disembodied from any predetermined cause and effect relations 
based on identification with a taxonomy of genus and species, 
instead bodies are considered as assemblages of plication:  
"It is no longer a question of organs and functions, and 
of a transcendent plane that can preside over that 
organization only by means of analogical relations and 
types of divergent development. It is a question not of 
organization, but of composition; not of development or 
differenciation but of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness" (A Thousand Plateaus 266). 
 
Deleuze invites a Spinozist perspective, introduces the study 
of Ethology instead of Biology, which he conceives as the 
relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities for 
affecting and being affected that characterize each thing. 
 
This is a conception that introduces two different axes for 
the definition of the individual for Moira Gatens. A kinetic 
one, that characterizes the individual in terms of relative 
states of motion (of speed and slowness) and rest that 
maintains the individual in existence as the same thing, and 
the dynamic one, which considers the body as a realm of forces 
in an immanent relation to affecting or being affected by 
other bodies. It is the range of affects and affectability 
that considers the differenciation between the bodies within 
the dynamics of existence. Bodies are encountered as 
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trajectories in which their "degrees of power" locate their 
existence on the cartography of existence (Gatens 167). 
 
As Gatens reminds, bodies become "social cartographies" mapped 
on the plane of immanence in which the two axes become the 
analysis of the "intensive capacities" and "extensive 
relations" of the bodies (168). This is the cartography where 
"…the body is defined with its longitude and latitude: in 
other words the sum total of the material elements belonging 
to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness (longitude); the sum total of intensive affects it is 
capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude)" 
(A Thousand Plateaus 260). 
 
Bodies become geographies of incorporealities in which the 
differential powers of individualities posit a complex 
differentiating. Bodies are constituted with a complication 
through other bodies where there is a constant indetermination 
that ceases all singular bodies to become a united assemblage. 
As this is not a cause and effect relationship actualized 
within a reciprocal manner, bodies do avoid any kind of 
organization based on a reductive or dualistic approach that 
contemplates on a definite separation in between. Bodies 
instead become experimental compositions, complex molecular 
coagulations, and instable figurations on the plane of 
existence, in which they infinitely move to become by folding 
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and unfolding into other becomings. Bodies encounter with the 
chance of becoming in relation to other compossible bodies 
within an economy of compatible and incompatible power 
relations with their surrounding. As those relations are at 
immanently constant flux, bodies do not become distinguishable 
by a hierarchy of forms (as animals or humans), but with their 
interrelated power relations that put the singular components 
into unstable tectonics of a molar assemblage. The 
incorporeality of a body is not apprised with the integrity of 
other forms, but instead with the intensive capacity to 
differenciate with the dynamics affects. Bodies do not become 
stable realizations, but instead actualizations within the 
ordinates of their becoming. 
 
Bodies, as such, do not become intrinsic parts of an 
organization adopted within the politics of a nature 
addressing pure species, genders or race, but instead 
considered as virtualities actualized with respect to other 
bodies. They are characterized with a precise indefiniteness, 
with an immanent introjection to a virtuality that disguises 
any specific or permanent contraction subjected to an 
appropriation as a realization. As Gatens cites from Deleuze, 
bodies do posit "various components (biochemical, behavioral, 
perceptive, hereditary, acquired, improvised, social, etc.)", 
however there is the crystalline infrastructure of virtuality 
that actualizes any sort of relationship through an expression 
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of an experimental corporeality that ceases to be identified 
particularly with any means of pregiven origins or ends.  
 
Bodies are always at the midst of their intervals, and it is 
the intensity, the "non dynamic energia," the virtuality, 
unfolding through the fabric of the body, perplicating, 
implicating, explicating and yet complicating this deep or 
groundless complexity (Constructions 72). Bodies become 
subject to unseen spatial dispositions in nature. Before being 
subject to any resemblance or identification, or congruent and 
commensurable forces, bodies belong to the slippery surface of 
multiplicities, that are so smooth that fixed qualities do not 
stick on them (Constructions 115). So that, the becoming of a 
body in its seamless architecture, is a continuity, which 
avoids any contemplation with a referential discourse that 
subordinate it in a temporary framework. Nevertheless, bodies 
are always 'reconsiderations' within the virtuality of 
thought. Provoked within a spatio-temporal individuality, 
bodies do territoralize, reterritoralize, and deterritoralize 
under different conceptions within the different faculties of 
thought such as perception, memory, imagination and 
understanding. Therefore it is always possible to consider a 
recapitulation for the singularity of a body without 
recognizing any violation such as presupposition of a 'being' 
by falling onto an ontological ground. Any legislation imbuing 
a temporality for the body becomes insignificant and 
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necessarily speculative as bodies become subject to an 
expression of an actuality only in the midst of their 
becomings rather than their representation as coherent and 
complete beings. 
 
Bodies are neither natural nor artifice, nor there is a 
definite separation imposed on both categories. It is a 
thinking along all former conceptions (Aristotelian, Platonic, 
Cartesian or Kantian) that is incorporated to the virtuality 
of the body. The 'technology of the body' is the cartography 
of both the intrinsic and extrinsic relations of its virtual 
structure. This is the reality of the body immersed in a 
virtuality with its genetic and differential elements, its 
'virtual' or 'embryonic' elements. These elements posit a 
determination for virtuality without "being possible to 
designate a point of view privileged over others, a center 
which would unify the other centers" (Difference and 
Repetition 129). For Deleuze, this must be a complete 
determination of the body, yet only form part of it. As he 
carefully distinguishes between the idea of completeness and a 
wholeness for an object for him: 
"What is complete is only the ideal part of the object, 
which participates with other parts of objects in the 
Idea (other relations, other singular points), but never 
constitutes an integral whole as such. What the complete 
determination lacks is the whole set of relations 
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belonging to actual existence. An object may be ens, or 
rather (non)-ens omni modo determinatum, without being 
entirely determined or actually existing" (Difference 
and Repetition 209). 
 
This is a conception of technology that is not recognized with 
an ontological separation between nature and culture or inside 
and outside. The “idea” contains all the varieties of 
differential relations, and all the distributions of singular 
points coexisting in diverse orders perplicated in one 
another" (Difference and Repetition 206). Therefore the idea 
of technology does not correspond to a doubling, to an 
inferior realization, imaging itself from the realm of 
possibilities, but instead responds to a conception of 
actualization that apprehends any becoming as a construction 
of another virtuality in which any differentiation is yet 
indistinguishable from the logic of virtuality. This is a 
technology of “affirming all chances at the same time” 
(Difference and Repetition 52). However affirmation is itself 
differenciation for the virtual body to become beside itself. 
The technology of the body is itself an unsettlement, a 
distantiation that is never at rest in which difference is 
itself differenciated within the incorporeal body.  
 
Once technology is not rendered as an extrinsic quality of the 
body, it does not extrapolate any conception as prosthesis, 
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which instruments the 'supplementary' to the integrity of the 
corporeality. In fact it becomes the incompleteness, always at 
the midst of its thinking, and continually arrives at other 
dispositions in relation to other incorporealities. Technology 
becomes a bodily construct, an expression, and an image of 
thought that is liberated from being either ‘mind’ or ‘body.’  
 
Hence, bodies cannot be framed with an idea of origin, nor can 
be embraced with an evolutionary perspective for Deleuze. 
Instead, bodies continuously construct to become with other 
systems, with other fields of intensities, "pass between 
points" in a nonlocalizable relation during their "absolute 
speed of movement" and form more complex virtualities out of 
their virtual origin. Therefore, there is no necessity for the 
separation of the subject and object of the body, in terms of 
marking a form and content for the line of becoming. Becoming 
becomes the duration of expressibility itself. And the idea of 
the body is not restored to posit a ground, a center, a 
history for becoming, but instead it is the becoming of a body 
that proceeds in continuity, in its infinite movement of 
differenciation, to be infinitely diluted in existence. It is 
a "perception", an actualization, an immobility, on its 
interrupted continuity, that reveals the inner history of 
things as bodies (Matter and Memory 208). Bodies do not exist 
as signs, words, marks of existence, or any simplified 
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conciliation, but as the realm of forces which are locus of 
production/expression of individuation. 
 
Thus, virtuality is the technology of the singularity (of the 
body) that experiences not a schematism of differential state 
of beings, inferior temporalities, in its infinite movement of 
becoming, but in return experiences a geography of creative, 
yet minor intensifications. Ethology endorses an inquiry of 
thinking in terms of "haecceities." Deleuze reserves this name 
for an event, "a spontaneous constellation of intensities that 
is not fixed or static, is not a subject, yet that 
nevertheless bears its own unique mode of becoming" (Davies). 
"You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and 
slowness between unformed particles, a set of 
nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a 
day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its 
duration)--a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack 
(regardless of its regularity)" (A Thousand Plateaus 
262). 
 
A haecceity is an infinite mode to feel spatio-temporal 
relations, determinations as dimensions of multiplicities, an 
event that has neither beginning nor end, which is always felt 
at its middle. (ATP, 263). Deleuze points the indistinction 
between the nature of the things and the nature as climate, 
wind, season or hour. 
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"The becoming-evening, becoming-night of an animal, 
blood nuptials. Five o'clock is this animal! This animal 
is this place!" (A Thousand Plateaus 262). 
 
In fact, Deleuze considers two different haecceities: an 
assemblage haeccetiy, a body that is contemplated on its two 
axes, the longitude and latitude; and the interassemblage 
haecceities, that are in return the singular becomings within 
each assemblage.  
 
3.7. Event 
At this point it is important to be familiar with the 
conception of event, and consider how it is constellated with 
the concept of body, with a different conception of 
temporality of time. 
 
Deleuze acquaints the duration of the event with the Stoic's 
conception of the indefinite time: ‘Aion’ in relation to 
‘Chronos.’ Aion is the time of the "floating line, that only 
knows speeds, the time of "already there", and "not yet here", 
a measure of something that is both going to happen, and 
already happened, is put in relation to Chronos, "the time of 
measure that situates things, develops forms, and determines 
subjects (A Thousand Plateaus 262). 
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For Deleuze, all bodies are relation to each other as causes 
for other causes or refer as effects in relation to other 
effects. (Logic of Sense 6). Bodies are appropriations as not 
as effects, but rather logical or dialectical attributes, 
actions and passions instead of physical qualities and 
properties. The corresponding of the body to a "state of 
affairs" is for a difference in nature. Events, the exegesis 
of the only living time of the bodies, are all at once the 
infinite present and the individuation of the Aion, where the 
present grasps both past and future, but only actualized by 
becoming infinitely divisible when the simultaneous reading of 
past and present is giving birth to it. 
 
Returning back to the Stoics, events are no less beings than 
bodies, substances, physical qualities, however they are 
something what Deleuze calls a higher sense of being at its 
incorporeal surface that incorporates being and non-being, 
"existence and inherence". Events are ‘something,’ part of the 
substance and disjointed from the cause-effect relation in the 
sense that they are incorporated into an expression of 
coexistence. This is an unlimited becoming at the border of 
things and propositions, when events are giving birth to the 
actualizations of things. Bodies produce new attributes to 
other bodies, but these attributes are in fact expressions of 
the events in nature, which constitute the endless activity of 
 69 
becoming ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ by putting the incorporeality 
of the bodies into an immanent relation. 
 
By maiming the passivity introduced by the cause and effect 
relationship, Deleuze introduces an infinite activity of 
actualization and counter-actualization at the immanent moment 
of becoming. The two temporal frameworks of the ‘already’ and 
‘not yet’ are the time of the event traversed in their 
becoming by effectuating the substantiality of the bodies.  
 
There is a recitation at the kernel of the becoming as a 
‘will’ coming into being. A ‘will’ that escapes any pity, any 
resentment, any narration of passivity, but instead on its way 
of becoming itself actualizes or counter-actualizes its body 
within the geography of the event. Events are the surfaces of 
presence where they subsist or insist in relation to each 
other, or to other bodies. They develop in respective 
tensions. Events are the "verbs" of the language for Deleuze, 
that happen not before or after substantives or adjectives, 
but through the split in the language, they become the 
‘existence of a conjugation of effects.’ Neither bodies, nor 
events do not exit outside the propositions that express them. 
 
Events have critical points for Péguy: "points of fusion, 
congelation, boiling, condensation, coagulation, and 
crystallization" (Logic of Sense 53). There is a virtuality of 
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the event that communicates a state of differenciation, a 
meticulous spatialization from one state of singularity to the 
other, felt at the same time. As they are only passes in 
between the same event, Deleuze introduces them as the only 
"idealities" as they are deduced from any conception of 
essence and essentiality in their nature. Rather, events are 
considered ‘problematic,’ according to a determination by the 
singular points in expressing the conditions and yet 
problematizing, as an infinite movement of imperfection that 
subsist an instance of a problem along with their spatio-
temporal actualization.  
 
And as events are not instances of problems that demand to be 
resolved, they cease to attain any subjective category, rather 
the event is the ‘dead time,’ time of the meanwhile, time of 
the virtuality, where all the 'meanwhiles,' all the components 
are affixed on each other. These are the simultaneous, yet 
imperceptible instants when the event is actualized from the 
‘composite becoming’ of virtuality.  
"Nothing happens, but everything becomes, so that the 
event has the privilege of beginning again when time is 
past. Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, 
because becoming continues to pass through its 
components again and restore the event" (What is 
Philosophy 158).  
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The virtuality of the event ceases to be fixed within a realm 
of effectuated moments. Event becomes an 'episode' within the 
continuous movement of virtuality. The origin of the event is 
movement, a character of immanent passing within the 
difference of the state of affairs in which there is a view of 
action as a fulcrum. In respect, there is the ‘will’ at the 
kernel of the event that makes it inseparable from the state 
of affairs, realities it actualizes, and yet makes these 
realities inseparable from the virtuality in return. Deleuze 
calls this the philosophy of "amor fati: being equal to the 
event, or becoming the offspring of one's own events" (What is 
Philosophy 158). However, this should not be regarded as an 
associationism with a precontrived knowledge about a fixed 
event, rather conceiving a confrontation with the event as a 
singular experience, a line of action. The reality of an event 
desists to become with a kinship or analogy with a former 
knowable experience and instead turns out to its virtuality 
that releases its own reality through an act of actualization 
of all its tacit components at the same time.  
 
Events are not immobile if they are perceived as condensed 
considerations of an enormous period of indefinite time. They 
should not be regarded as quasi-instantaneous views within a 
permanent conception of time; rather they are definite and 
precise virtualities that restore a consistency of change and 
movement by all of their components. The conception of events 
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does not utilize a privileged indefiniteness, an obstruction, 
which is pointing an essence of repression exterior to its 
virtuality. In fact, the virtuality of the event is not 
constructed out of multitudinous successive moments as 
different states, as different ‘reliefs’ for being. 
 
Consequently, the virtuality of the event is always the 
movement that banishes all preconceived idea of interpreting 
time and space by measuring the disparate moments. If we 
return to Bergson, the successive moments are only the 
imaginary halts of representation, and yet the continuity 
cannot be conceived with an instant, "the path cannot be 
substituted for the journey" (Matter and Memory 220). The 
event prolongs within its virtuality. Bergson points the 
artificiality of the mind that separates the corpuscles from 
the corpus. By avoiding a conception of relativism of the 
moments with each other, there is the reality for the movement 
of the event that pictures the motion as a whole. This 
conception ceases to presuppose a realization of time by a 
dividing into representable instants, but conceive a reality 
of the composite virtuality that is expressed by the will of 
actualization and counter-actualization, the differentiation 
of the line of action at all planes of the becoming of the 
event. 
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The conception of the time and space of the event are not 
preexisting definitions, the event is neither the illusion of 
a certain perception, nor the perception itself is different 
than the thing perceived. "Space is no more without us, than 
within us" (Matter and Memory 209). It is the movement that 
grounds time and space beneath itself. The conception of the 
movement banishes the solidarity of time and space, besides it 
is devoid of any relativistic perspective that will 
reconstruct one in opposition/relation to the other, by the 
relative position of a subjectification. The conception of the 
event does not to propose new correspondences between the 
extensities of time and space, rather introduces an 
abstraction that interprets time and space as conceptions 
conditioned to the problem of the event.  
 
For Bergson, the immediate reality is to banish all 
preconceived interpreting and measuring of the quality and 
movement of the event. The illusory character of perception 
(of the eye) and imagination (of the mind) posit false 
problems, "prejudices" exposed on the experience of the event 
(Matter and Memory 209). This is to register a contradictory 
approach to translate the event out of the individual 
experiences of the mind and the body in relation to a fixed 
conception of time and space as the essential difference 
between the movement and the quality attributed to individual 
conceptions. Rather it is the singularity of the instance, the 
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moment when everything is new born at the actualization of the 
event. Time and space and a subject are not pre given, and do 
not correspond to the data of the senses; indeed conform with 
the becoming of the event, expressions of the movement, and 
therefore become indistinguishable from each other, as 
composite singularities perceived in the virtuality, anterior 
to the movement.  
 
Each event becomes an actualization of a virtual composite, 
however each event cannot be thought as an opposition, as a 
separation from its other. As each actualization does not lose 
contact from the rest, they should not be thought outside the 
movement. Deleuze reminds us that the character of the event 
introduces virtuality to any actualization, which will in 
return provides a seamless architecture to the creation of new 
events beside themselves. Unlike realization from a 
possibility, actualization can never be thought separate from 
its virtuality, but only as an alienation from the rest of 
itself. An actuality of an event, a becoming, is still a 
movement within the virtuality, which is never given, but 
acted out through actualization (Bergsonism 104). 
 
3.8. Natural-Artificial and Technology 
While thinking along these concepts, it would be important to 
return back to the concept of technology, and think along the 
nature of relations among concepts. It would be important to 
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consider how the nature of technology can be reconsidered with 
its virtuality and then how virtuality can be discussed along 
its way as an actualization of technology. The nature of 
thinking about the acquisition of knowledge and the 
instrumentation of knowledge would be substantial in 
understanding the mechanism of thought that displays the 
nature of constructing relations. Thereupon it would be 
possible to articulate on the inadequacies of conceptions that 
are obstructed not with the quality of their relations, but 
with the very underlying mechanisms that situate thinking to a 
particular ground of contemplation. Therefore the technology 
of virtuality can be discussed with the mechanisms of ordering 
relations, recognitions and knowledge, and additionally can be 
discussed with the way it illustrates an opening to the 
virtuality of technology along its way of becoming. 
 
In this way Bergson's articulations on the nature of thinking 
and the orders of acquiring knowledge on things can be 
regarded useful in introducing a different conception to 
technology in relation to virtuality.  
 
Bergson considers a continuous activity of creation, a 
becoming for all bodies by moving along their intrinsic and 
extrinsic relations and associates this system of relations to 
a theory of knowledge that expresses a mechanism of thought 
for the mind in ordering two different kinds of relations in 
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nature: one in a ‘natural direction,’ and one as an 
‘artificial’ direction coined as the ‘geometrical mechanism’ 
(Creative Evolution 244). The natural direction is expressed 
with a "will", that continually thinks freely and advances in 
the form of tensions, and the latter is adopted as the 
inversion of the other by utilizing an "inert" or "automatic" 
order that operates on reciprocally determined elements 
externalized and imposed on a relation to the others. The 
order of knowledge expressed as the natural direction 
corresponds to a thinking with a spontaneity of movement 
towards unforseen ends, however the geometric mechanism in 
return resembles a conception foreseeing ends by utilizing 
already established agreements between subjects and objects in 
terms of determinations by causes and effects. This is a 
thinking that orders a reality that exactly satisfies a degree 
of thought by isolating individual conceptions, regarding 
things from certain bias, and applying certain conventions of 
measurement to them. 
 
This is the artificiality of the mind to comprehend knowledge 
by dividing the continual movement of thought through its 
different faculties (perception, intelligence, and language). 
Bergson posits this science as contingent and relative to its 
variables, relative to the order in which the answers become 
successive correspondings to the foreseen problems. This way 
of ordering knowledge will always fall back into some of our 
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mathematical formulae for Bergson, as "it is weighted with 
this geometry" (Creative Evolution 243). There is a remarkable 
expectation and disappointment related to this system, in 
which there is the presentation of a mind that is in quest for 
a certain system, for a certain order, a possibility, but that 
is not concerned with a virtuality of thought at that moment. 
This is a mind seeking after reciprocal answers, therefore it 
discloses itself to any awareness for unforseen ends. Bergson 
comments on the "idea of disorder" as the disappointment of a 
mind that ends up with "something different from what it 
wants, an order with which it is not concerned at that moment" 
(Creative Evolution 244). There is a confrontation with a 
different order in nature that relentlessly does not 
correspond to answers and in which the questions raised 
ordering the knowledge for the foreseen order, already have 
vanished.  
 
The ordering of knowledge towards the natural direction, on 
the other hand, utilizes an oscillation. Without falling into 
a conception of finality, it refutes into falling into a 
category determined by former thought. It is a creative 
evolution for Bergson, that cannot be expressed by any 
approximation of ideas or possible generalizations that are 
the views of the mind (Creative Evolution 245). ‘An order of 
unforseeability’ itself is reserved for this nature of 
thinking that does not correspond with the features of other 
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orders, but in contrast, deviates from them, with a 
spontaneity of a movement that acclaim its features in itself. 
There is the instrumentation of relations, a conception of 
technology, without inferring to certain special 
manifestations of life, which almost repeat forms and facts 
that are already known, similarity of the structure that we 
find everywhere between what generates and what is generated. 
Bergson coins the habit of designating and representing 
relations to a certain point of view as follows: "I find a 
mechanism where I should have looked for", however any 
unforseen reality is due to "shutting our eyes" to things that 
do not interest us. The natural direction of thinking utilizes 
a conception of thinking knowledge not in its states, or 
instants in which the mind utters an artificial plan to 
represent the complex movement of thinking, but rather 
conceives knowledge in its change, in its becoming. 
 
However, the artificiality of thought cannot be grasped 
unnatural indeed. Although the different faculties of the mind 
conceive any conception as a snapshot of a transition, 
transition itself teaches nothing to us according to Bergson 
(Creative Evolution 334). It is the movement of the very 
reality of the mind that restlessly installs itself within the 
movement of change, to grasp both the change and the 
successive instants that might be immobilized. For Bergson 
this is to "advance with the moving reality". However, 
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although there is the decomposable reality that ceases to 
correspond to a motionless point, and slips through the 
intervals, the intelligibility of reality is a continuos 
experience with the infinite sensation of the infinitely 
infinitesimal elements which correspond to the "qualities, 
forms, positions and intentions" of the intervals. The faculty 
of knowing acts upon a determination by a generalization (by 
denotating and connotating incompatible objects and elements) 
and the experience of reality is prolonged with the movement 
of thought yielding to a perpetual becoming and thus confines 
it into an infinite creation in every consideration.  
 
Bergson coins an "unco-ordinated diversity" between the two 
different approaches of thinking, a continual coming and going 
which refutes a differenciation that constitutes "encountering 
with an absence" in one in relation to the other. Instead, 
there is a virtuality of thought that reserves many aggregates 
of different relations with their diversity without being 
endowed with any provisional expectation. (Creative Evolution 
306) 
 
Therefore the technology of thinking does not associate with a 
form of reality, but a reality that is the continual change of 
form at every instant (Creative Evolution 327). The apparatus 
of knowledge place itself on a realization of thought, however 
the conception of virtuality correspond to the mobility of 
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reality that is not realized from a realm of possible 
expectations, but ceases to be actualized in its becoming. 
 
The conception of naturally and artificiality of thinking is 
an experience of thinking in movement, and installing oneself 
to the movement to grasp it. Different natures of ordering 
knowledge can be regarded useful in elaborating the 
instrumentality of setting different relations of thought as 
the conception of technology. 
 
As it is possible to conceive the faculty of knowing in its 
movement, in its continual change, it is also possible to find 
a conception of technology in its entire becoming, a becoming 
contrived as a virtuality of thought that is seized as 
actualized with the different faculties of knowledge. 
Different relations and different schematism of systems are 
consequently the instants cut as distinct bodies of thought 
from the perception of the continuo of thinking. Therefore it 
is possible for the conception of technology to be emancipated 
from an artificial "will", substituted for the mechanism of 
nature or released from an alleviation as an "automatic order" 
of a geometric mechanism that correspond to an inability of 
knowing due to a contemplation with pre ordered, reciprocal 
determinations. Technology can be grasped in its virtuality 
without being reduced to the externalized conceptions or 
generalizations that constitute the intelligibility of 
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knowledge. Instead, it is possible to utter a "willing" 
experimentation of thought, a natural direction of thinking to 
its conception that orients towards the reality of thought. 
Corresponding merely to the instrumentation of all the 
(intrinsic or extrinsic) relations between the individuated 
bodies of thought, technology ceases to be reduced to certain 
conception of science and measurement system that implement 
preconceived individual systems that are relatively 
independent to each other.  
 
The course of movement of technology cannot be reduced to a 
thinking with a logic of realization, a course to realize a 
possibility once conceived as impossibility or unreality, to 
be thought isolated from unforseen ends. Nor it cannot be 
completely detached, isolated from a movement of "detension" 
that falls outside the geometry of thinking, outside the 
foreseen ends. Instead, the evolution of technology can be 
comprehended as the "unco-ordinated" diversity of thinking 
‘along,’ as the virtuality attaining its unceasing creative 
transformation. Hence, it is possible to subsume the different 
natures of this movement of thought with its acceleration and 
deceleration. Differentiation between the different 
signification systems of thought such as thinking in different 
representation systems, languages, algorithms or various other 
mathematical lexicon then corresponds to an evolution within 
the virtuality and thus does not become devalued as thinking 
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in foreseen possibilities of thought, but considered as 
instrumentations of accelerations and decelerations within the 
same continua of thinking. If the technology of perceiving the 
knowledge is confined in its movement, the virtuality of 
technology is imbued within this movement as an inner 
becoming, rather than disposed at an outside to reconstitute 
it with immobile conceptions. Although each isolated 
conception cannot respond to the continuity of a change, 
coincide with a motionless point; the installation of this 
artificiality within the flux, is not a formidable obstacle in 
the immanent evolution of technology, rather is the advancing 
of this mobility in its very reality, comprehended as an 
intelligible reality.  
 
Technology can rather be conceived not as the artificiality 
that is a prosthesis posed on to the natural direction, but 
the very becoming of the knowledge of the mind in a multitude 
levels of awareness. As an experimentation of thinking is 
always reserved before the conception of knowledge in its 
finality, technology of the thought corresponds to the 
virtuality of thinking that is still attaining to an 
alienation from itself in its becoming. Any becoming of 
technology, either as the form of intelligible conception of 
thought or as an instrumentation finalized as an apparatus or 
device that coincide with an actualization, still prolongs 
with its virtuality with its continuity of becoming. 
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Technology, similar to the Zeno of Eloa's arrow 'is' not at 
any point of its course, and could not be regarded only as 
intelligible knowledge or sensible reality, but rather it 
corresponds to the continua of the sum of relations 
experienced in the composite structure of its virtuality. 
 
According to Bergson the very mechanism of our ordinary 
knowledge is cinematographic (Creative Evolution 332). The 
apparatus for knowledge proceeds through the faculties of 
"perception, intelligence and language" attain qualitative, 
evolutionary and extensive movements, but nevertheless 
represented as "discontinuities", "particular becomings of a 
series of views" (Creative Evolution 333). As "what is not 
determinable is not representable", and as all representation 
is exclusionary in nature, the "becoming" in general 
corresponds to a movement "like in the cinematographical 
film", a movement hidden in the apparatus, whose function is 
to superpose the successive pictures on one another in order 
to imitate the movement of the real object" (Creative 
Evolution 335). The nature of becoming is thus conceived as an 
act of imitation of the reality by reactivating the immobile 
percepts into the mobility of becoming. However, Bergson 
reminds of a 'becoming' in which the mind is attached to the 
inner becoming of things where becoming becomes 
indistinguishable from the reality of the continua of change 
and escapes such cinematographical mechanism of thought. 
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This two kind of differenciation for the nature of ‘becoming’ 
can be considered helpful in foregrounding the confusion 
between reality and unreality. The experience of reality is 
often reduced to a perception, which tries to constitute the 
immobilized movement with potential immobilities and hence 
cannot escape the illusion of unreality due to the necessary 
distance between the real and the represented thing, a 
distance operating on an exclusionary character based on 
certain determinism. Reality, thus in its becoming is the 
movement of indifference between the perceived thing and 
perception, foregrounding the composite, virtual, crystalline 
structure. 
 
Therefore, it would be positing a false problem against the 
nature of knowledge only as a state of thinking rather than a 
movement, to insist only in its discontinuous character, and 
to question the immanent artificiality embodied within the 
very nature of us that enables the possibility of 
intelligibility. It would also be positing a false problem 
against the nature of technology as a state of knowledge 
rather than a continua, in which different actualizations 
correspond only to the extensions of the very nature of the 
evolution, the creative movement. It is the virtuality of 
thought at the very kernel of technology, which refutes to see 
any disclosed system, any engineered reality as an unreality, 
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and instead confronts with an actuality of becoming of a 
reality through its virtual character.  
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4. REMARKS ON DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF VIRTUALITY  
Given these articulations above it might be contingent to 
depict some significant aspects of thinking that might be 
considered helpful in understanding the influences of Bergson 
and Deleuze's conception of virtuality to the general 
discourse. These aspects could be pointed not as taxonomical 
positions of a composite organization of thinking for a 
subject, rather as passages within a cartography of relations, 
the very technology that yield further fertile grounds to 
discuss the subject matter. As discussed within the previous 
chapter, virtuality perpetually becomes itself by avoiding any 
completion in thought. However, it would be important to think 
virtuality along with these countenances to release the force 
of thinking in its infinite directions. It would be possible 
to consider virtuality as an event of thinking, experiencing 
many confrontations in variety of strata. 
 
The concept of virtuality can be an experienced as a singular 
approach on each conception by enunciating the concepts with 
other planes of thought. In other words, it becomes the 
movement within the plane of immanence in which different 
aspects can traverse with each other in the accumulation of 
the faculties of thought. 
 
It is possible to consider these aspects as follows: 
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4.1. Virtuality and Criticism 
Virtuality does not operate on a critique based on limited 
conceptions addressed to particular problems, but always 
opening itself to an affirmation for a constructionist 
thinking. However this thinking is not appraising values on 
top of other values and operates on the symbolic exchange 
between values. It is rather experimentation with thought 
without any claim of recognizing the boundaries of the 
capabilities of each concept. Instead, virtuality provides 
different levels of awareness within the becoming knowledge of 
each conception and let them traverse without even becoming 
enclosures to themselves. 
 
Virtuality does not obstruct thinking, nor bases itself in any 
obstructionist, sedentary point of view. As it does not claim 
to offer solutions to formerly conceived problems, it 
actualizes the individuation of each problem with its 
virtuality and explores them in their own merits (becomings). 
Therefore, it would be more convenient not to pose any 
articulation of virtuality onto a extraneous framework and 
discuss it with a critical manner. As this will only celebrate 
the inferiority of the critique, the concept of virtuality 
will only be obliterated, more or less, with an appropriation 
to secure its distance against its other.  
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As the idea of the critique always renders itself possible by 
positing itself by an idea of a limit, that is, in other words 
marking the 'difference' between the exact interior and 
exterior for the concept by indicating the very territory that 
the concept acts upon. Thereupon, this conception of a 
critique can only address to certain figurations of the 
concept that are already transfixed with their contour and 
left incapable of confronting with the problems casted upon 
other planes of thought. 
"To criticize is only to establish that a concept 
vanishes when it is thrust into a new milieu, losing 
some of its components, or acquiring others that 
transforms it. But those who criticize without creating, 
those who are content to defend the vanished concept 
without being able to give it the forces it needs to 
return to life, are the plague of philosophy" (What is 
Philosophy 28).  
 
In this sense Deleuze's example is illuminating: 
"The fact that Kant 'criticizes' Descartes means only 
that he sets up a plane and constructs a problem that 
could not be occupied or completed by the Cartesian 
cogito. Descartes created the Cogito as concept, but by 
expelling time as form of anteriority, so as to make it 
a simple mode of succession referring to continuous 
creation. Kant reintroduces the time into the cogito, 
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but it is a completely different time from that of 
Platonic anteriority. This is the creation of a concept. 
He makes time a component of a new cogito, but on 
condition of providing in return a new concept of time: 
time becomes form of interiority with three components-
succession, but also simultaneity and parmenance. This 
again implies a new concept of space that can no longer 
be defined by simple simultaneity and becomes form of 
exteriority. Space, Time and 'I think' are three 
original concepts linked by bridges that are also 
junctions" (What is Philosophy 32). 
 
Therefore, the conception(s) of virtuality discussed through 
Deleuze's philosophy should not be regarded as positioning a 
critical distance to any (vanishing) concept that celebrates 
or criticizes virtuality within a particular framework. As any 
criticism takes the ‘rest’ as its points of reference, Deleuze 
suggests every explication corresponding to a relative 
success, an inferior solution to the conditions of the problem 
raised to a discrete conception. Throughout its vocabulary, 
the conception of virtuality becomes neither an attempt to 
locate any strategy as presentation of an enduring 
(metaphysical) completion in thought, nor becomes a practice 
of thinking at the proliferation of a border resisting and 
desisting through other figurations of former thought. It is 
rather an immanent structuration of relations at their midsts. 
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However, as Andrew Benjamin notes, "relations involves 
recognitions (that what cannot be precluded at connections and 
interconnections)", virtuality is not about an absolute 
differentiation proceeding on "temporal set-ups" as 
recognizable conceptions. Rather there is the introduction of 
a different kind of relation, the "fold", that traverses each 
conception with its virtual totality. As Andrew Benjamin 
reminds from Heraclitus, "the issue is not whether or not it 
is possible to represent the all-that which is given to be 
represented-in the totality of the conception", rather to 
release it with its force, that confines a multiplicity of 
other relations expressed throughout its becoming. The 
virtuality of the whole is not to emancipate the unthinkable 
from its thinker or to foreground the recognizable 
unrecognized by its subject, yet to present the movement of 
thought instantiated on different planes as an act of folding. 
Each folding is onto another folding at its midst so that it 
does not posit an ontological deteoriation, but instead a 
fertile complexity, a continuity that prolongs until the end 
of the act of thinking. 
 
Virtuality suggests contemplation without inextricably falling 
into constrains of coherent and composite formations, and thus 
resists becoming any mediation in between concrete 
determinations. Rather there is a relentless thinking in 
virtuality releasing a ‘sincere vagueness’ to the conceptions. 
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Conceptions do not become conflated with their language and 
interrupted as representations of disparate beings. There is 
the vagueness expressing itself at the continuum, the 
becoming, which is irregularly composed through an indefinite 
flow.  
 
4.2. Virtuality and the Conception of the Metaphor 
Returning back to the language of this continuum, the 
technology again is virtuality itself, both as the composite 
whole, and yet as the singular becoming individuated in an 
actualization. It is important at this point to return to the 
popular understandings of virtuality as a construction of a 
linguistic or visual metaphor within the different 
articulations of time and space expressed with the technology 
of the medium that represents it.  
 
As discussed in the contemporary articulations on technology, 
there is the presentation of an ambiguity that renders the 
mechanism of virtuality always in relation with a separation 
from reality. The representation of the reality and the 
registration of the realness of a thing are often thought as 
separate modes of thinking. Therefore the thing itself, and 
its representation and the perception of it are experienced as 
different natures uttered to 'thingness.' Virtuality is 
brought into consideration either as a linguistic or visual 
possibility of a dissimilar nature, being apart from the so-
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called 'real' one. The mechanism of virtuality is essentially 
based on the technology of language that operates within the 
metaphors of thought. However, what corresponds to the 
exactitude of a ‘meaning’ and what builds the ‘metaphor’ in 
relation to a particular meaning are two concepts that can be 
articulated with a different layer of thought under Deleuze's 
philosophy. There is the immanent conception of movement that 
ineliminably defers any recognition as concrete meaning. Once 
significations are presented within their virtuality, they 
develop by necessarily becoming other then themselves. There 
is no fixed position for a meaning, but yet singular 
individuations that are encapsulated with the virtuality of 
their thought. The concept of metaphors undergoes a different 
conception in two ways. First of all, each conception is 
uttered with its unique becoming that is in other words, 
concepts do not attain a certain meaning, but only refer to 
temporal significations referring particular moments within 
particular contexts. Secondly as each conception is a becoming 
in itself and ceases to ‘be’ a closure onto itself, they only 
traverse within the multiplicity of their meanings during 
their line of differenciation. Therefore the difference 
between an actual meaning and a metaphor that stands for that 
actuality is unsettled within this framework. Once the 
proximity between the reality and the virtuality of the 
meaning is crossed and the indistinction in between is 
experienced with its limits, there will not be a need for a 
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necessary claim to render something as a real meaning and 
something as its virtual other. And once the distinctions is 
erased the conception of meaning only refer to singular 
representations of virtuality along its line of 
differenciation within the continua of thinking. As concepts 
do not even become themselves, they cannot be conceptualized 
with and as metaphors, but along their way of becoming only 
rendered as infinite actualizations within the seamless 
architecture virtuality. Thereupon metaphors are not installed 
before and after of the fixation as meaning, but confined into 
the very nature of the concept, that interprets any claim of 
separation unnecessary. 
 
Accordingly, the conception of virtuality in Deleuze is not a 
re-discovery of an elusive singular metaphor. Rather there are 
the different velocities of thinking as acceleration and 
deceleration in meaning. The reality of the seer and the 
reality of the seen, become indistinguishable enough and yet 
sufficiently differenciated within the virtual structure. 
There is the movement of a mobile distance, a variation as the 
differentiation among infinite conceptions. Moreover, 
imagination of a metaphor corresponds only to a fixation of 
the trajectories of thought, which are only trespassing within 
the continuum. As discussed above, the conception of 
virtuality is not an inspection to release other fixations, 
but instead it is to utilize the movement itself as the 
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indefiniteness before any figuration of thought. There is a 
virtual structure in which every singular conception, every 
differentiation corresponds to the movement itself.  
 
It is important to note that there is no beginning and end for 
the spatialization of movement. The utilization of movement is 
not ‘an application of the movement’ oriented towards the 
static mode of being, to release the fixed trajectories from 
their static mode of being in order to yield a reconsideration 
to emancipate ‘unthought’ possibilities out of them. The 
movement is already a plane of immanence, a preconception in 
which every singularity is infinitely new born with its 
virtuality without any recognition, and any fixation that 
signifies a futile redemption. All conceptions are already 
mobile and the virtuality of thinking is actualized as a 
rhythm of movement within the constant flux. All remarkable 
points of meaning have different velocities within the 
movement and it is the movement that abandons any solidarity 
of meaning. 
  
Deleuze reminds us two conceptions of actualization from 
virtuality: Virtual images, and actual objects. Virtual images 
cannot be separated from actual objects, and in a continuum, 
objects become virtualities in return. It is a conception of 
time, a ‘hesitation’ in becoming that spatializes time within 
the virtual cartography and hence distinguishes the actual 
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image (of the present) and the virtual image (of the past). 
However, this distinction, the utterance of an unassignable 
limit, is only crystallization for Deleuze and form a circuit 
of exchange. Virtuality is discussed as a crystalline 
structure in which actual and the virtual are part of the same 
circuit, the object and its image become indiscernible. 
 
Virtuality does not fix further meanings or dispose rigid 
utterances, but utilize the indefiniteness of movement of 
thought in the realm of language. The term of indefiniteness 
corresponds not to a state of identifying with an indefinite 
identity (anything), but rather points to a preconception in 
which no identification took place at all (something). The 
concept is actualized within its virtual incorporeality 
without any grounding such as ontological projection as a 
being associated to something. Thus, it is the language itself 
as the immanent virtuality that is grasped as the syntax of 
‘the movement of thought’ which is not semantical but 
sensational. 
 
4.3. Virtuality and Technology 
Once virtuality is conceived as the language of the perpetual 
actualization of technology, and once this language is 
discussed as incorporated into the very nature of virtuality, 
it would be important to consider the concept of technology in 
confrontation with all its infinite components of thought 
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actualized within its line of becoming. Technology, then, may 
not be considered with a limited point of view, which may only 
consider instrumentation of a particular kind of knowledge. 
Thus, would be emancipated from its particular definitions 
(i.e. 'Technology as prosthesis,' 'technology as an 
instrument') and be conferred with its own 'becoming' under 
all configurations of thought that may correspond to the whole 
geography, the summa continua of all relations among all 
bodies. The form and becoming of technology of virtuality 
bifurcates to all directions, all layers of thought and 
becomes indiscernible from the virtuality of its language.  
 
Imbued with virtuality in nature, all progress of activity 
that is essentially practiced or thought thus becomes 
persistent within the virtual character and articulated 
inwardly within this movement. Therefore it becomes diffident 
to problematize a decomposable history of technology, as a 
history of mediation through successive positions, discussing 
it a set of activities posed on particular time and geography. 
Rather, technology in its virtuality becomes the whole 
cartography of relations, the natural and artificial orders 
for acquiring knowledge under different reference points. 
Within its indivisible and irregular movement, technology 
becomes a history of evolution of a complexity, a folding and 
unfolding of relations that never conclude with an idea of 
finality or progress of certain conceptions. Even following 
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the movement itself as a heterogeneous multiplicity 
articulated in rhizomic structure, virtuality explicates the 
involvement with technology, as the rhythm of expansion and 
contraction in setting relations between the bodies in the 
continua. The flow of thinking does not correspond to a linear 
reality, a narration based on cause and effect relation but 
instead as a ramification towards a realistic multiplicity 
that contemplates on each singularity as rupture. 
Nevertheless, contemplating on the concept of virtuality at a 
singular point (i.e. The virtuality within the technology of a 
single word, image, book or a computer system… etc.) then 
becomes a false attempt to render it visible. As each 
actualization may not differenciated from the flux and can 
only be introduced with its virtuality in its own becoming, 
each actualization can be regarded as an event, an 'episode' 
at the immanent becoming of technology throughout its 
components. 
 
The virtualities created within the rhizomic environment are 
differenciated conceptions as different complexities that 
undergo different histories. It is possible to conceive these 
singular histories, technological ruptures, actualizations, 
becomings as different states within the intelligibility of 
knowledge identified with a genealogy of representation 
systems (such as images, marks, signs, codes, alphabets… etc.) 
mediated through different complexity of assemblages (such as 
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geometry, algebra, language…etc.). Albeit these systems are 
only particular perceptions of technology, infinitely ramified 
through different histories, the reality of the virtuality is 
within the infinite constant flux, within the all faculties of 
knowledge.  
 
The conception of virtuality can be regarded in its own 
becoming as used a fulcrum to introduce different nature of 
relations based on the technological framework discussed in 
the second chapter. As John Rajchman illustrates the 
conception of virtuality could be regarded as a blueprint of 
an immanent architecture for constructing different typologies 
of time, space, body and experience, different then the 
contemporary articulations based on Platonic, Aristotelian, 
Cartesian, Kantian, Newtonian or Einsteinian conceptions. 
Deleuze and Bergson's conceptions could be discussed both 
against ‘dogmatic determinism’ and ‘relativist points of view’ 
that criticize specific speculations on virtuality leaning on 
particular standpoints.  
 
For example, from a historical perspective, images, paintings, 
books, photorealistic graphics, photography, certain kind of 
computer generated imagery, immersive digital environments and 
simulations are discussed as virtualities in relation to a 
specific conception of reality which is often contemplated as 
the analogical resemblance with what is so-called ‘natural.’ 
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The progress within the technology itself is recurrently 
engaged with the experience of creating 'better' virtualities, 
better in the sense of achieving more accurate resemblance 
with naturals, referenced to an outer reality or better in the 
sense of realizing more complex self-conceptions, simulacra 
that are conceived artificial enough as self referential, 
reflexive individuations themselves. 
 
The artificiality, as the determination of thought, is often 
discussed discernable from its natural character (brain is 
separated from its body) and thus posed onto the nature of 
‘being.’ By reducing each conception to identification with 
deterministic subjectivity, a critical distance is always 
secured between disparate conceptions to exercise a 
dichotomous logic that is both criticized and celebrated at 
the same time. 
 
The enunciation provided for the concepts duration, time, 
body, event could be considered helpful in understanding how 
the technological framework discussed for virtuality can be 
opened throughout the vocabulary that impeded it once. 
Virtuality, within the framework of digital technologies, is 
often projected ‘for and against’ a reality, its actual 
presence is often presupposed with an absence. However the 
subject is never thought as a reality in itself and along 
different conceptions. 
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For example, due to grounding to a certain trajectories of 
technology, virtuality is only discussed as different 
experiences of spatialization in a context of a book, a 
computer game, a VR installation, or any verbal and visual 
construct that correspond to a mediation of space based on 
certain inception of language, and end up with only 
representing the realization of a possibility retrieved from a 
potentiality of thought which is not considered with its 
virtuality. 
 
Starting from a single image, and proceeding throughout the 
history within the framework of a multiplicity of media, the 
so-called artificial environment is changing its locality of 
meaning within different environments. Today, virtuality is 
mostly associated with digital technologies, and computational 
thinking that enable the possibility of considering more and 
more complex and intense virtualities to be constructed with 
the suppositions of many different conceptions that utilize 
different considerations of thought. Such as different 
interpretations of time (Aion, Chronos) and different 
understanding of space (Cartesian, Eistenian, Rainmanian) are 
studied and cultivated within the former thought in order to 
consider different possibilities of virtuality. When a virtual 
reality experience is discussed, it is often grounded to a 
corporeal body that is situated with a linear conception of 
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time, a definite conception of space based on a Cartesian 
geometry and amplified through different sensations based on 
the knowable, expected narration based on cause-end effect 
relations. However, based on the advances on different 
complexities with the technologies, the experiences of the 
virtualities are often thought extended and intensified. It is 
possible to discuss today, singular experiences within the 
digital environments, that promise a multitude of 
experimentation with the corporeality of the body, enforcing 
further discussions within different spatio-temporal 
structures, and opening the self to a multiplicity of 
relations with its environment. These journeys through the 
artificial environments are not only simulation based 
exercises necessarily bounded to referential qualities with 
nature. These transformations, abstractions, interactions and 
sensations are unique exercises experienced within the realm 
of digital technologies. It would only be a limited 
understanding to believe that the immersant4 is only disclosed 
to the means of established relations. The augmented reality 
is the very reality of the immersant that is instrumenting a 
natural exploration within the environment of its becoming. 
The grasping and the processing of these mechanisms cannot be 
thought too far from the technology of the immersant mapped to 
the cartography of relations, opening and transforming a 
conceptual framework. The technology that forecasts the future 
of virtuality within the digital systems, is never at rest, 
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and always affect our thinking to a considerable extent. The 
conception of virtuality is always ‘undefined’ by each 
singular experiment, and each attempt nevertheless is part of 
the same actualization that comprehends virtuality to a 
certain extent.  
 
The concepts of technology and virtuality can be naturally 
discussed in relation to each other as both of them are 
intertwined and do operate on the same nature of relations 
that are in fact virtual. Here virtuality can be postulated as 
the very experience of constructing different orders of 
knowledge or even utilizing the indefiniteness in order to 
correspond the multitude of relations among bodies. 
 
Within this entire framework, the crucial point is not to set 
a definite conception for virtuality, and try not be confined 
into an immersion with this definition. Whether the technology 
experienced is as basic as writing, or more intensified as 
experiencing the highly advanced computational systems, 
virtuality shall not be grasped with the idea of its ‘limit’ 
(its foreseen, and representable ends) and shall not be 
restraint only with the logic for transcending this limit. As 
the possibilities to extend the limit is always presented 
within the same mechanism, the emerging and withdrawals depend 
necessarily on the experience within a definite conception 
posed onto this limit. Each different actualization of 
 103 
technology will always contribute to the complexity of 
virtuality that is not ‘pre-configured’ with its limit, but 
with its movement of becoming. 
 
4.3.1 The Reality of  the Virtual 
As any actualization is necessarily territoralized within its 
own conditions, the concept of virtuality can be regarded as 
‘undetermined’ for each conception in its own becoming and 
experiencing the midst of every thought with the infinite 
rupturing of the infinitesimal elements during thinking. This 
would be similar to the experience of installing the 
cinematographic knowledge apparatus, the mind, attaching 
itself to the inner becomings of things (Bergson) and attain 
an immanent rethinking through each conception. This is to 
instrument a creation originating from outside, to mobilize 
immobile conceptions and exercise a recomposition, 
reinstallation into the decomposable movement. Virtuality can 
be considered as an immanent practice of actualization from 
one disparate conception becoming the another. The reality of 
the virtuality can be grounded as the technology of thought 
becoming itself at every actualization, yet imbued within a 
virtual character which enables it to be discussed always in 
other fertile grounds, other planes of thought, in other words 
each form can be reintroduced to its incorporeality under 
different contingencies within the continua of thinking. 
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It is possible to elaborate with an example. Seeing through 
the 'eye' machine or the VR helmet do not become too different 
actualizations of virtuality if they are only confronted with 
the problem of seeing, to solve a problem posed on finding a 
solution "in terms of light" (Bergsonism 103). As Deleuze 
notes, each time the solution will be as good as it could have 
been, "given the way in which the problem was stated, and the 
means that the living being had at its disposal to solve it". 
Virtuality is not an act of responding with more complete and 
better solutions, but insisting on the subsistence in 
rethinking with more complex assemblages of thought. Different 
histories of technological conceptions could therefore be 
discussed in relation to other geometries of thought, to 
release a creativity ordering different orders that were not 
concerned at particular moments. Instead of a narration based 
on cause-effect relations, predeterminisms or expectations, 
the conception of virtuality becomes the experimentation with 
the technology of thought by ordering the unforseen relations. 
 
Any actualization, instrumentation can be discussed as a 
contraction and expansion relationship within the rhythm of 
the spatialization of virtuality. Actualizations can never be 
regarded as too contracted that turn into a ‘being’ conceived 
outside the becoming of virtuality, and never extended enough 
to become pure formless incorporealities that correspond to 
the non-existing, to the ‘unthought.’ To be engaged with an 
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immanent discussion of a singular virtuality, any sense of 
thought is still a formation, but with an incomplete logic; a 
becoming of a thought at its midst, attaining a certain 
vagueness through its movement. As the nature of ‘becoming’ is 
discussed here as a ‘verb’ of indetermination, it is 
constituted by the superposition of the successive points in 
between to imitate the nature of the immanent movement. 
(Creative Evolution 336) 
 
4.3.2 The Virtuality of the Real 
The conception of the reality of the virtuality discussed 
above can be discussed as inserting other movements by other 
conceptions, within the immanent movement as the continua of 
thinking. However it is also useful to discuss the nature of 
the virtuality of the movement in itself, the becoming 
virtuality of the virtuality, the natural direction where no 
particular virtuality, no actualization is yet ordered. The 
immanent movement is experienced without any reconstitution 
along disparate conceptions. Virtuality is discussed in its 
own becoming, as a subject in itself, which escapes the 
cinematographical mechanism and corresponds to the transition, 
to the change itself. 
 
The conceptions provided within the second chapter, which are 
discussed within Deleuze's and Bergson's philosophies, can be 
understood as the reflection of the very nature of virtuality, 
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in which virtuality partakes a logic of differenciation even 
under different conceptions of the same concept. The 
diminution of a ‘being’ for the virtual subject is imbued in 
its nature where the partial views provided by the 
actualizations become indiscernible from the movement itself. 
The becoming of the virtuality thus refuses to undergo an 
approximative determinism based on singular conceptions and 
retain as the plane of immanence for each conception. The very 
nature of the virtual concept cannot be regarded as 'lost' 
during its movement and then re-encountered under different 
circumstances, however as there is the necessary 
incompleteness in the crystalline structure, each 
actualization of the virtuality adds itself to the complexity 
of the structure and partakes a role in virtualization. This 
is the perpetual creation of virtuality along its 
actualization. As each actualization is affirmed within the 
immanent structure, virtuality is never suspended or 
repressed, but intensified and complicated. The reality and 
the virtuality of the virtual are in fact, inseparable 
becomings from each other, as the very nature of thought is 
advancing the movement, the creative unfolding, through its 
infinite conceptions. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Char Davies coins the verb "de-habituation" when she means to 
describe the intimate experience, the "unusual modes of 
perception" felt during her challenging approaches to virtual 
reality installations4. These activities merely correspond to 
installations that are experiencing the nature of the 
technology actualized throughout its infinite components. The 
ground of this experience are bodies that embrace many 
different roles in experiencing a multitude of relations. In 
between the flux of the actual becoming of the experience, 
immersants5 stray within a multitude of speeds in thought and 
becomes unavoidably associated with the movement, its 
actuality and its virtuality in the continua of their 
becoming. These actualizations of technology can be conceived 
as events where virtuality is experienced within its different 
thresholds, with other openings intensifying the very nature 
of bodies that are de-habituated from their regular order. 
The reality of the nature of the bodies are opened to an 
unforseen visibility that is not conditioned with an invisible 
or non-visible, but to the continua of seeing, sensing and 
experiencing virtuality along itself.  
 
If this study did not aim to arrive at conclusions about a 
definite conception of virtuality, it basically endeavors to 
elucidate the movement of thought subjected to illustrate both 
the foreseen means and unforseen ends, and vice versa. If the 
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movement itself is considered as the cause of the continua of 
thinking, the thought stripped bare from its layers and 
represented within its finitude would be only expression of 
the movement confining in its own body throughout the whole 
act of becoming. It would not be a wrong attempt to consider 
this study as only as a glimpse, as an episode of meaning 
during the 'collective assemblage of enunciation' for 
virtuality. As each 'episode' will already change its nature 
at the second consideration, it will only be possible to 
attain an approximation, and adequation for the conception if 
virtuality is expected where it has been lost. 
 
If one still strives to think a distinguishing mark among the 
different natures of virtuality represented by different 
figures such as the 'insectness of Gregor Samsa' or 'the 
reality' of the digital character Lara Croft, the conception 
of virtuality flees from itself and only undergoes a 
degradation subjected to providing answers to the questions 
raised to define differenciated nature of beings in relation 
to each other, but not to the nature of becoming itself. Thus, 
it would be possible to conceive an actuality of an 
unrepresentable order that is immanently represented as a 
virtuality, an unforseen order that cannot be rendered visible 
if figured by a formerly established one.  
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Rather, it is possible to note an awareness for an immersence 
in particular thought while still looking for unforseen 
directions. The immersant will always roar among different 
realms of meaning within the continua of thinking, therefore 
the complication of virtuality will always get more 
intensified at each attempt that endeavors to unfold it to its 
bare structure. 
 
The typographical, lexical or syntactical virtualities will 
only correspond to the very reality of language, the 
technology of thougt. The reality of the world, the field of 
representation and the field of the subject thus become 
multiple entryways and exits that shall always be experienced 
with this continuum. Therefore, different directions within 
this motion will only conform by thinking along with the 
former conceptions and with the continuously introduced ones, 
virtuality becomes only a denser surface. The denser surface 
of meaning that inevitably introduces further considerations 
and enforce the immersant to contemplate inexorably on other 
episodes of thought. It would be the infinity of this thought 
that will confront with the finitude of this text and let the 
immersant stray, again with another conception, to be immersed 
to its immanent plane of thinking, to be attached to its 
technology of becoming. One must not need to repulse or thwart 
against each figuration of thought or each actualization of 
such kind of a text, rather confide into the virtuality itself 
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that will be rendered visible at its finitude, but should be 
grasped at its infinitude, as the inhabitation of the reality 
on its 'de-habituated' artificiality and along the 'natural' 
way of its becoming.  
 
Not for the sake of all the things that should be known by 
nature, but of which that are eventually not need to be 
dismissed at the infinite moment of thinking within the 
synthetic topography of thought. 
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Notes 
 
1
 The word "differenciation" is adopted as a convention from C. 
Boundas's article "Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the 
Virtual" (90-91). The use of this verb instead of 
"differentiation", for him, is presetenting the totality of 
the diacritic relation that occur within the structure of 
virtuality. 'Differenciation' corresponds to the actualization 
of a virtuality and refer to more complex relations then 
differentiation. "What is ‘differenciated’ must first of all, 
differ from itself, and only the virtual is what it differs 
from itself." 
 
2
 For a specific referral to these media studies, it is 
possible to state that, the general framework discussed is 
mainly part of the studies handled by Bolter, Darley, Hillis 
and Kirby. These remarks are presented as some of the major 
aspects held around the discussion of virtuality. These 
approaches are considered ‘critical’ in terms of their focus 
on a certain aspect of virtuality that mostly refer to the 
social and cultural impacts of digital technologies and 
computer generated environments on human life. These 
‘critical’ approaches are considered ‘alleviative’ points of 
view as they privilege certain conceptions to other possible 
meanings and operate on utilizing the difference, the limit 
held in between. As ordering a specific conception for 
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virtuality will necessarily exclude many others, these 
approaches are not criticized but presented with their own 
range of capabilities expressing an awareness of virtuality.     
 
3
 The use of 'image of thought' in this text is a conception 
adopted from G. Deleuze and J. Rajchman. For Rajchman, 
creation of concepts always supposes creation of images. 
However these images do not correspond to "representations of 
something," but instead to the fabrication of the relations, 
temporal figurations, the 'seen' directions of thought as the 
objects of thinking. (Deleuze Connections 32-33) 
 
4
 The word "immersant" is adopted from the vocabulary used by 
Char Davies. This term refers to the ‘user’ or ‘agent’ of a 
virtual reality installation experiencing an ‘immersence,’ by 
sensing being part of this environment.  
 
5It is referred here to Osmose and Éphémère 
"Osmose (1995) is an immersive interactive virtual-realty  
environment installation with 3D computer graphics and 
interactive 3D sound, a head-mounted display and real-time 
motion tracking based on breathing and balance.  Osmose is a 
space for exploring the perceptual interplay between self and 
world, i.e. a place for facilitating awareness of one's own 
self as consciousness embodied in enveloping space." 
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"Éphémère (1998), is an interactive fully-immersive 
visual/aural virtual artwork which furthers the work begun in 
Osmose (1995)." 
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